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Is Efficiency Biased? 
Zachary Liscow† 
Efficiency is a watchword in policy circles. If we choose policies that maximize 
people’s willingness to pay, we are told, we will grow the economic pie and thus benefit 
the rich and poor alike. Who would oppose efficiency when it is cast in this fashion? 
However, there are actually two starkly different types of efficient policies: those 
that systematically distribute equally to the rich and the poor and those that system-
atically distribute more to the rich. 
Our collective failure to grasp this distinction matters enormously for those 
with a wide range of political commitments. Many efficient policies distribute more 
to the rich without the rich having to pay for their bigger slice. Because these “rich-
biased” policies are ubiquitous, efficient policymaking places a heavy thumb on the 
scale in favor of the rich. Especially at this time of heightened concern about 
inequality, getting efficiency right should matter to a wide swath of the policymaking 
spectrum, from committed redistributionists to libertarians. We should support 
efficient policies only when the poor are compensated for their smaller slices or when 
efficient policies systematically distribute equally to the rich and the poor as we grow 
the size of the economic pie. 
This Article points a way forward in ensuring that a foundational tenet of the 
law does not follow a “rich get richer” principle, with profound consequences for 
policymaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that a city is considering building neighborhood 
parks, each of which costs $1 million to build. The residents of a 
rich neighborhood are willing to pay $2 million for the park, but 
the residents of a poor neighborhood are willing to pay only 
$500,000, less than the cost of construction. Suppose as well that 
the park increases the well-being of the rich and poor by the same 
amount. Should the city build a park in the rich neighborhood, 
the poor neighborhood, both, or neither?1 
A dominant policymaking ethos of our time—perhaps the 
dominant one—is the pursuit of economic efficiency.2 The typical 
efficiency-based economic analysis of law gives a clear answer: 
build the park in the rich neighborhood but not the poor 
neighborhood. Doing so is efficient. This goal of economic 
 
 1 To simplify, assume for now that people do not move due to park construction so 
that no gentrification occurs. See discussion of issues like gentrification in Part VI.B. 
 2 See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 
102 Cal L Rev 1457, 1458 (2014) (“For more than three decades, executive orders govern-
ing White House regulatory review have specified cost-benefit analysis [another term for 
analysis of economic efficiency] as the normative framework for evaluating agency rules.”); 
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165, 
167 (1999) (“[Economic efficiency’s] popularity among agencies in the United States gov-
ernment has never been greater.”). For commonly used textbooks taking this view, see, for 
example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 15–20 (Wolters Kluwer 9th ed 
2014); Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 7–8 (Addison-Wesley 6th ed 
2012) (saying that the book “will focus on efficiency rather than distribution” in analyzing 
the law because of the availability of the tax system for redistribution); Steven Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 2–3 (Belknap 2004) (describing social welfare as 
the normative basis for analysis in law and economics, but then restricting attention to 
efficiency by excluding analysis on distribution). 
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efficiency is reflected throughout the law, especially in 
administrative cost-benefit analysis3 and common law 
adjudication.4 It has reached such a status that one keen observer 
has called the notion that economic policy should be efficient 
(apart from explicitly redistributionist tax and transfer 
programs) the “Brookings Religion”—that is, the standard goal 
for policy analysts across the country, as exemplified by the work 
of the famous think tank in Washington, DC.5 The advocates of 
economic efficiency point to its ability to grow the size of the 
economic pie, making everyone better off.6 As they say, a rising 
tide lifts all boats.7 But efficiency’s critics, especially outside of 
economics, suggest that efficient policy pays insufficient attention 
to the needs of the poor.8 This view resonates with critiques of 
neoliberalism and the “Washington consensus” view that 
governments should adopt efficient, growth-inducing laws.9 
This Article works from within economics itself to describe 
the hidden meaning of efficiency, identifying the particular bias 
against the poor in many, but not all, efficient policies. It makes 
 
 3 See Executive Order 12866 § 1 (1993), 3 CFR 638, 638–40 (requiring cost-benefit 
analysis in federal agencies); Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4 *8 (Office of Management 
and Budget, Sept 17, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/A4NA-R3P5 (“Where there are 
significant regional variations in benefits and/or costs, you should consider the possibility 
of setting different requirements for the different regions.”). See also Part IV.A (listing 
examples). 
 4 See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L Rev 487, 502–07 (1980) (arguing that the common 
law is efficient and that this is normatively desirable). See also Part IV.B (listing 
examples). 
 5 Email from Lawrence Mishel, former President of the Economic Policy Institute, 
to Zachary Liscow (Jan 3, 2018, 8:23 pm CST) (on file with author). 
 6 See, for example, Richard O. Zerbe and Tyler A. Scott, (Almost) Everybody Wins: 
A True Pareto Justification for Practical Welfare Economics and Benefit-Cost Analysis, *25 
(University of Washington School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LJ5P-WRAR; Leslie Carbone and Jay Richards, The Economy 
Hits Home: What Makes the Economy Grow? (The Heritage Foundation, July 1, 2009), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8B7G-K4C9; John R. Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers’ 
Surplus, 8 Rev Econ Stud 108, 111 (1941); Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in 
Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 Econometrica 242, 
258 (1938). 
 7 See, for example, Gene Sperling, How to Refloat These Boats (Wash Post, Dec 18, 
2005), archived at http://perma.cc/EQ6A-J8X9 (discussing the history of the phrase). 
 8 See, for example, Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J Legal Stud 191, 200 
(1980); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 Phil & Pub Aff 
3, 16–19 (1975). Professors Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner note that efficiency-based 
cost-benefit analysis leads to a “bias in favor of wealthy people” because the wealthy gen-
erally are willing to pay more for a project. Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 184 (cited in 
note 2). 
 9 See, for example, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Be-
come? 9 (Verso 1996) (describing the emphasis of neoliberalism on efficiency). 
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three contributions. First, it introduces a new concept, “legal en-
titlement neutrality,” that classifies efficient legal rules based on 
their “bias” toward people of different incomes. Second, it charac-
terizes conditions under which an efficient policy distributes 
more, less, or the same amount of legal entitlements to the rich 
and the poor. These conditions produce a heuristic rule: money is 
neutral. Otherwise, efficient policies are probably biased toward 
the rich. That is, in many cases—discernable based on criteria in 
this Article—one of the dominant paradigms in the law is biased 
against the poor, which is a particular concern given rising dis-
satisfaction with economic inequality as exemplified by the inter-
est in the work of Thomas Piketty.10 Third, it offers implications 
for policy. In particular, by showing that efficiency is not just in-
different to the poor but is actually often biased against them, this 
Article offers an important reason to adopt less efficient legal 
rules that are less biased against the poor. 
Understanding these claims requires some precision in under-
standing what “efficiency” is. When this Article asks, “Is efficiency 
biased?,” it refers to “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,” the typical defini-
tion used in economic analysis of the law. Kaldor-Hicks (K-H) effi-
ciency maximizes individuals’ willingness to pay for a policy 
change.11 This goal is particularly associated with scholars like for-
mer Judge Richard Posner but is a common goal for setting poli-
cies, as it is viewed as maximizing the size of the economic pie. 
When critics say that efficient policies are biased against the poor, 
they reference efficiency’s basis in “willingness to pay.”12 Because 
the rich have greater wealth, the view goes, they will tend to have 
a greater willingness to pay, and therefore policymakers maximiz-
ing efficiency will choose policies that benefit the rich over the poor. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, when the efficiency norm rose to 
dominance in the economic analysis of the law, there was vigorous 
critique of the alleged bias of efficient policies against the poor.13 
But remarkably, this foundational critique of the most common 
 
 10 See generally Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Belknap 
2014). For an article typical of that response, see, for example, Paul Mason, Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital: Everything You Need to Know about the Surprise Bestseller (The 
Guardian, Apr 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XB2X-WPM4. 
 11 For a thorough discussion of K-H efficiency, sometimes confusingly called “wealth 
maximization,” see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in Peter Newman, ed, 3 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 679–84 (Macmillan 1998). 
 12 See Baker, 5 Phil & Pub Aff at 15 (cited in note 8). 
 13 On the side arguing bias: Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can 
Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 Hofstra L Rev 671, 684 (1980); Dworkin, 9 J Legal Stud 
at 200 (cited in note 8); Baker, 5 Phil & Pub Aff at 16 (cited in note 8). 
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goal in the economic analysis of law, if not in all analysis of law, 
never quite crystallized. Opponents came up with powerful exam-
ples of bias against the poor, and had a strong intuitive account, 
but never reached a general critique of efficient policymaking’s 
biased distribution that carefully considered qualifications.14 Ra-
ther, the question largely went into hibernation. By revealing the 
inner workings of K-H efficiency and its application to legal rules, 
this Article provides that general critique but also qualifies ear-
lier critiques, showing that efficiency is more complex than either 
its supporters or critics suggest. 
The debate about bias in efficient policymaking went into 
hibernation in part because a view took hold among economic 
analysts that distributional consequences of efficient policies 
were inconsequential because taxes and transfers either should 
or do address distributional concerns.15 The mantra is to have 
efficient policies that may harm the poor, grow the economic pie 
as large as possible, and then slice the pie equitably by 
redistributing to the poor through taxes16 to address 
distributional concerns.17 That is, if the tax system achieves the 
appropriate distribution of income, then the distributive impacts 
of nontax policies do not matter.18 
 
 14 See, for example, Dworkin, 9 J Legal Stud at 197–200 (cited in note 8). See also 
discussion in Part I. 
 15 For examples of this argument, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public 
Finance: A Study in Public Economy 18 (McGraw-Hill 1959) (describing the separate allo-
cation and “[d]istribution” branches of government and the “a priori preference” for using 
taxes and transfers to achieve distributive goals); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why 
the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J 
Legal Stud 667, 674–75 (1994); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Econom-
ics 127 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1989); Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, Distribu-
tional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scandinavian 
J Econ 264, 266–71 (1979) (presenting the first mathematical statement of this general 
reasoning). 
 16 See Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 677 (cited in note 15). 
 17 For a description of welfare economics, see, for example, the long-standing 
standard graduate-level microeconomics textbook, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. 
Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 117–22, 817–50 (Oxford 1995). For 
a philosophical defense of using social welfare functions for evaluating social choices, see 
generally Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (Oxford 2012). 
 18 This two-step of efficient nontax policies and distribution through taxes will often 
result in the optimal policy. However, even this view’s most ardent defenders acknowledge 
that it is not always right on its own terms. See Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 
677–81 (cited in note 15). Others argue that redistributing with legal rules can be more 
efficient than redistributing through taxes. See, for example, Zachary Liscow, Note, 
Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as 
well as Efficiency, 123 Yale L J 2478, 2486–88 (2014) (arguing that the inefficiency of 
redistributing through taxes creates a need for legal rules that are more efficient at 
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This Article makes a different—and, in the context of eco-
nomic analysis, uncommon—assumption: the distributional con-
sequences of policies “stick,” as a variety of political frictions de-
scribed by political scientists suggests could be the case.19 A policy 
that hurts the poor does not lead to increased transfers to the 
poor, and a policy that benefits the poor does not lead to increased 
taxes on the poor. As a result, policies’ distributional impacts mat-
ter. What assumption is empirically correct is an open question, 
but this Article works out the implications under the plausible 
notion that distributional impacts stick. 
In this context, this Article introduces the concept of “legal 
entitlement neutrality,” which means that, if one’s income 
changes, one’s efficient allocation of legal entitlements does not 
change. It thus classifies policies by their tendency to assign a 
larger or smaller amount of legal entitlements to different indi-
viduals on the basis of their income. By “legal entitlement,” this 
Article means stuff that the government allocates—for example, 
clean air, provision of parks, spending on infrastructure, or road 
safety. Legal entitlement neutrality is primarily a question of 
“fairness” in allocation: For a given type of efficient policy, do 
richer people tend to get more, less, or the same amount of stuff? 
Two things should be noted about legal entitlement neutral-
ity. First, “neutrality” in this Article refers specifically to this con-
cept, not some broader platonic concept of neutrality. For exam-
ple, in the view of many, a policy that increases well-being equally 
for everyone would probably need to give more money to the poor 
than to the rich because a dollar may buy more well-being for the 
poor than for the rich, owing to the rich’s greater resources.20 Bias 
 
redistribution and listing criteria for guidance); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing 
the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L Rev 1003, 1069–70 (2001) (arguing that the 
model used to support tax-only redistribution, though itself limited, actually supports an 
eclectic approach to distribution policy); Chris William Sanchirico, Optimal 
Redistributional Instruments in Law and Economics, in Francesco Parisi, ed, 1 Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Economics 321 (2017) (offering a survey and assessment of the 
literature on optimal redistributionist legal instruments). But that critique is not the 
subject of this Article, which grants this aspect of traditional law and economics reasoning. 
 19 See notes 63–72. See also Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on 
Distributional Impacts from School Finance Litigation, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud 4, 18–
29 (2018) (offering supportive empirical evidence); Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. 
McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 Minn L Rev 1051, 1085–
89 (2016) (making a similar argument); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 
1 Harv L & Pol Rev 303, 314–15 (2007) (“The simple point is that realistically speaking, 
the choice is often between some status quo and a policy that is both inefficient and 
welfare-increasing.”). 
 20 The reasoning results from the “declining marginal utility of income,” a common 
assumption but one upon which this paper’s reasoning does not depend. See generally, for 
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here refers to an allocation of goods and services, not utility. Se-
cond, it refers only to efficient policies, not to other types of poli-
cies, which are not characterized by a presence or lack of legal 
entitlement neutrality. 
Efficient policies can be “poor-biased,” “rich-biased,” or 
“neutral.” A policy is poor-biased if, as one gets richer, one gets 
fewer legal entitlements from efficient legal policies. For these 
policies, the poor are willing to pay more than the rich for the 
legal entitlements (such as public bus routes, perhaps), so 
efficient legal rules endow the poor with more of them. Poor-
biased policies are rare because it is unusual for the poor to be 
willing to pay more for anything than the rich. As a result, this 
Article focuses on the division between the more frequent rich-
biased and neutral policies. 
An efficient policy is rich-biased if, as one gets richer, one 
tends to get more legal entitlements from efficient policies.21 For 
these policies, the rich have a greater willingness to pay for the 
legal entitlement than the poor, so efficient policies endow the 
rich with more of them. There are lots of rich-biased policies be-
cause there are lots of things that the rich are willing to pay more 
for than the poor.22 
An efficient policy is neutral if, as one gets richer, efficient 
legal rules do not change one’s legal entitlements. In particular, 
everyone has the same willingness to pay for one dollar in in-
creased or decreased income: everyone’s willingness to pay for $1 
is $1. Neutral policies are common in the law. For example, the 
willingness to pay of two identical laundromats, one owned by a 
rich person and the other by a poor person, to stop pollution from 
a neighboring factory that is reducing the laundromats’ profits by 
$1 does not depend upon the laundromat owners’ incomes. Both 
owners are willing to pay $1 to avoid the harm. Generally, busi-
ness contexts that shift profits from one business to another (for 
example, in tort, contract, and corporate law) are neutral because 
everyone has the same willingness to pay for a dollar of profit. As 
this Article argues, subtle differences in policy context can lead to 
big differences in bias. 
 
example, Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 
Minn L Rev 904 (2011). 
 21 Both here and throughout, this Article uses a convention of talking about the “rich” 
and the “poor” as a shorthand for talking about distributional consequences; the relevant 
income differences can be between the super rich and the middle class or the middle class 
and the poor. Legal entitlement neutrality is asking the same question: As income 
changes, do efficient policies endow individuals with more or less of a legal entitlement? 
 22 See Part III.B. 
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While any given neutral policy may benefit the rich or the 
poor, neutral policies grow the size of the economic pie without 
systematic bias toward the rich or the poor. It is thus plausible to 
believe that they have distributional impacts that even out across 
many policies. Such a belief is not reasonable for rich-biased pol-
icies, which systematically, as a matter of methodology, distribute 
more to the rich. After revealing this hidden division, this Article 
illustrates it using an extended example involving tort liability. 
The underlying math is described in the Appendix. 
Notwithstanding this division between policies, overall effi-
ciency analysis places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of rich-
biased policies because the rich—due to their greater wealth—are 
generally willing to pay more for the things that legal entitle-
ments confer.23 Thus, rather than allocating resources to the poor, 
who are most in need, efficient policies tend to do the opposite: 
allocating resources to the rich, who are willing to pay the most. 
Efficient policies will therefore tend to allocate more valuable le-
gal entitlements to the rich: more spending on transportation, 
more parks, and cleaner air in rich places than in poor ones. This 
Article calls this phenomenon the “rich get richer” principle of law 
and economics. In effect, unless their distributional consequences 
are offset, efficient polices tend to reinforce the existing wealth 
distribution: greater ownership of wealth entitles individuals to a 
larger allocation of policy entitlements—even if the rich do not 
pay for it.24 That is, rich-biased policies give disproportionate le-
gal entitlements to the rich for free, exacerbating inequality. 
Legal entitlement neutrality is important because many be-
lieve that at least some areas of government policymaking should 
not give more or fewer legal entitlements to people on the basis of 
their income. In particular, many hold the view that certain 
branches of government (often the courts and administrative 
 
 23 See, for example, Bengt Kristrom and Pere Riera, Is the Income Elasticity of 
Environmental Improvements Less Than One?, 7 Envir & Res Econ 45, 47–48 (1996) 
(reporting exclusively increasing willingness to pay for environmental improvements with 
rising income). 
 24 The key point is that nothing about efficiency requires the rich to pay for the 
greater entitlements that they receive. In practice, the rich may or may not pay for them. 
The distribution of some legal entitlements (for example, spending on a new park) requires 
a government outlay; the sticky distribution assumption means that, to pay for the outlay, 
the taxes of the rich do not increase relative to those of the poor in proportion to the ben-
efits the rich receive. But not all legal entitlements require a government outlay—for ex-
ample, the right to pollute allocated by tort law. In these cases, a party can just get an 
entitlement without any need for various parties to fund the entitlement. 
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agencies) should not redistribute,25 redistribution being the exclu-
sive province of the legislature. Efficient policies, which often re-
distribute toward the rich, may seem problematic not only to 
those who favor redistribution to the poor but also to others, such 
as libertarians, who do not want the government to treat people 
differently because of their income, or to those who are concerned 
about the legitimacy of the state.26 
A detailed discussion of policy implications is beyond the 
scope of this Article. But the analysis does suggest a two-point 
rubric for addressing the distributional impacts of efficient 
policies. This Article provides guidance on when and why to 
consider adopting inefficient policies if one wishes to both avoid 
redistributing toward the rich and adopt policies that make 
everyone better off. The rubric can be applied whenever the law 
considers efficiency. 
The first and threshold question is whether the context is one 
that is likely to lead to a rich-biased rule. For neutral policies, 
distributional impacts may even out over time: as a matter of 
methodology, there is no bias. For rich-biased policies, however, 
there is an inherent legal entitlement bias. Second, does the in-
stitutional context suggest that policies’ distributional effects will 
be offset or be sticky? For example, legislatures can more easily 
adjust policies to address distributional concerns; administrative 
agencies and courts are less able to do so, making it more likely 
that the perverse distributional consequences described here will 
stick.27 If the efficient policy is rich-biased and has distributional 
impacts that are sticky—and if we hold one of the broad range of 
normative commitments suggesting that distributing more legal 
entitlements to the rich without the rich paying for them is per-
verse—then such a policy should not be adopted. Instead, policy 
alternatives that are explicitly inefficient, with a goal of putting 
the rich and the poor on equal footing, should be adopted. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the precise 
meaning of efficiency. Part II describes the traditional view that 
policies should maximize efficiency, with distributional impacts 
addressed by taxes and transfers. This Article then departs from 
that conventional view by supposing that policies’ distributional 
 
 25 See, for example, Posner and Adler, 109 Yale L J 165 at 186 (cited in note 2) (de-
scribing the typical view of the purpose of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory agencies as 
“separat[ing] out the distributional issue”); Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 675 
(cited in note 15) (regarding courts); Posner, 8 Hofstra L Rev at 502–06 (cited in note 4) 
(same). 
 26 See notes 135–38. 
 27 Liscow, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud at 7–8 (cited in note 19). 
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impacts stick, making the distributive impacts of efficient policies 
an essential question. Part III introduces “legal entitlement neu-
trality” and illustrates the concept with examples. Part IV offers 
real-world illustrations of rich-biased policies from administra-
tive law and torts. Part V discusses potential policy responses. 
Part VI responds to potential critiques. 
I.  EFFICIENCY: AN EXPLANATION 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the typical metric used in law and 
economics and is the primary subject of this Article. Throughout 
this Article, references to “efficiency” or “efficiency analysis” 
mean K-H efficiency unless otherwise noted. K-H efficiency (also 
sometimes called “cost-benefit analysis”28) measures the willing-
ness to pay of the parties affected by various policy options and 
then chooses the policy that maximizes the sum of the willingness 
to pay of those parties. (This Part gives an intuitive explanation, 
leaving the technical, mathematical definition of K-H efficiency 
to the Appendix.) By choosing policies most responsive to people’s 
preferences (as reflected by their willingness to pay), K-H effi-
ciency thus maximizes preference satisfaction given both the cur-
rent distribution of income and the constraints, like a limited 
budget, under which policymakers operate.29 Doing so maximizes 
so-called “social surplus,” or just “surplus”: people’s total willing-
ness to pay for a given social arrangement.30 
The desirability of K-H efficiency is based in part on the no-
tion that it is relatively observable. In particular, unlike utility or 
well-being, which are not directly observable, willingness to pay 
is, at least in principle. The reason is that, in real-world markets, 
we observe people paying for things, and if someone pays for 
something, presumably she is willing to pay for it. Thus, by allo-
cating legal entitlements to people who are willing to pay for 
them, K-H efficiency seeks the arrangement of goods, services, 
and externalities that the free market would achieve, taking the 
 
 28 K-H efficiency and cost-benefit are not quite the same for technical reasons involv-
ing prices changing when policies change. Those differences have little impact on the pre-
sent analysis, so it does not consider them. See Robin W. Boadway, The Welfare Founda-
tions of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 84 Econ J 926, 926 (1974) (first describing this so-called 
“Boadway paradox”). See also Chris Jones, Applied Welfare Economics 29 (Oxford 2005) 
(explaining the Boadway paradox in greater detail). 
 29 See Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 405 (Norton 3d ed 1992). 
 30 See id. 
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current wealth distribution as given.31 However, unlike in mar-
kets, in which parties actually pay for what they receive, K-H ef-
ficiency asks about hypothetical willingness to pay. That is, K-H 
efficiency is not about what parties did pay, but rather what they 
would have paid, and it does not require that people actually pay 
for what they receive. 
Put a different way, by seeking to maximize willingness to 
pay,32 efficiency analysis promotes the allocation of goods, ser-
vices, and externalities that would result if there were free bar-
gaining and everyone who gained from the new policy compen-
sated those who lost, whether or not the compensation actually 
takes place. If two parties are affected by a policy change, and one 
party would be willing to pay more for a policy change than an-
other party would be willing to pay to avoid the change, the policy 
is efficient—regardless of whether there is actually a transfer 
from the beneficiary to the harmed party.33 Adopting an efficient 
policy ensures the total amount that people are willing to pay in 
aggregate for policies has increased. As former Judge Posner fa-
mously put it, in a sense, “wealth” has increased34—not in that 
people have more money in their bank accounts, but rather in the 
sense of total surplus (willingness to pay for social arrangements) 
increasing. Adopting such efficient policies then respects people’s 
preferences by adopting the policies that they value most. 
K-H efficiency is different from two other concepts also used 
for economic analysis. The first is Pareto efficiency.35 A policy is 
Pareto efficient if there is no alternative policy that makes 
someone better off without making anyone worse off.36 A policy 
 
 31 One feature of K-H efficiency is the so-called Scitovsky paradox, in which the effi-
cient outcome depends upon whether the wealth distribution used is that from before or 
after a change in legal rules. See generally Tibor de Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Proposi-
tions in Economics, 9 Rev Econ Stud 77 (1941). This feature also does not impact the pre-
sent analysis, so it is put to the side. 
 32 Strictly speaking, the goal of efficiency could be maximizing either willingness to 
pay or willingness to accept. These two values can differ, partly for reasons explored at 
length in work in behavioral economics. See generally Jack L. Knetsch, Yohanes E. 
Riyanto, and Jichuan Zong, Gain and Loss Domains and the Choice of Welfare Measure of 
Positive and Negative Changes, 3 J Benefit-Cost Analysis 1 (2012). This Article does not 
engage with that important literature because its findings do not affect the basic 
arguments made here. 
 33 See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L 
Rev 509, 513 (1980). 
 34 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J Legal 
Stud 103, 120 (1979). 
 35 Pareto-superior changes are those that benefit at least someone while harming no 
one. A Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient outcome is one that has no more Pareto-superior 
changes left to make. See Coleman, 8 Hofstra L Rev at 512–13 (cited in note 33). 
 36 Id at 513. 
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that is Pareto efficient is thus an improvement on the status quo. 
However, Pareto efficiency has been criticized as unhelpful 
because, for most policies, making no one worse off is impossible 
due to the large number of people involved.37 Part of the appeal of 
K-H efficiency is that it delivers policy recommendations without 
the very stringent requirement that no one be made worse off. 
Indeed, K-H efficiency is also sometimes called “potential Pareto 
efficiency” because it is viewed as identifying changes that 
increase overall surplus and thus have the “potential” to be 
Pareto efficient after transfers from those who gain from the 
policy change to those who lose from it.38 
Another concept used in economic analysis is “social welfare” 
or well-being. Though the goal can take a variety of forms, most 
typical is developing a measure of each individual’s utility level, 
summing those, and then choosing the policy that maximizes that 
sum of utilities (which potentially can be weighted).39 There are a 
variety of ways that social welfare maximization can differ from 
efficiency analysis. For this Article’s purposes, the most im-
portant way is that allocating money, goods, or other forms of le-
gal entitlements to individuals with low incomes may increase 
utility because of the declining marginal utility of income result-
ing from money being less valuable to rich people, a conventional 
assumption in economics.40 Efficiency analysis, in contrast, does 
not directly consider the declining marginal utility of income and 
thus does not systematically allocate resources to the poor. 
Some—most famously, Posner in the 1970s and 1980s—take 
K-H efficiency as the ultimate goal of government policy.41 More 
 
 37 See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase 
Further, 100 Yale L J 1211, 1216 (1991). 
 38 See Coleman, 8 Hofstra L Rev at 513 (cited in note 33), citing Guido Calabresi and 
Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 85–86 (Norton 1978). 
 39 Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic Theory at 117–22, 817–50 (cited 
in note 17) (explaining the use of welfare functions in economics). 
 40 See, for example, Lawsky, 95 Minn L Rev at 915–19 (cited in note 20) (defining 
declining marginal utility); Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 
BC L Rev 1363, 1395–98 (2004). 
 41 See Posner, 8 J Legal Stud at 103, 111–35 (cited in note 34). Posner found in K-H 
efficiency an appealing mix of Pareto efficiency and utilitarianism, without the downsides 
of either. This Article will not revisit the debate on the merits of Posner’s justification for 
wealth maximization, in part because that has already been extensively argued. See 
generally, for example, Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative 
Principle, 9 J Legal Stud 227 (1980); Dworkin, 9 J Legal Stud 191 (cited in note 8). In 
addition, it is not clear how much Posner himself supports the argument anymore. See 
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 
85, 85 (1985). For example, Shavell claims that Posner “has since adopted instead other 
social goals (which he labels pragmatic).” Shavell, Foundations at 667 n 1 (cited in note 2). 
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commonly, though, law and economics scholars take well-being as 
the ultimate goal of policy but nevertheless support efficient pol-
icymaking in many arenas for at least one of two reasons. The 
first is that efficiency maximizes the size of the economic pie that 
taxes and transfers can then redistribute to address concerns 
about distribution. Part II discusses that argument. Another ar-
gument is that, across a large number of efficient policies, distri-
butional consequences will even out.42 The rich will benefit from 
some policies and the poor from others. But across a large enough 
number of policies, everyone is better off. So the best way to max-
imize welfare is to adopt efficient policies, which will ultimately 
maximize welfare. This view should be familiar to anyone who 
even occasionally reads the news and is associated with com-
ments like “a rising tide lifts all boats”43 and (among critics) 
“trickle-down economics.”44 
This popular view in support of efficiency has an analogous 
popular view opposed to it, often associated with critics of 
neoliberalism, who argue that efficiency pays insufficient 
attention to the needs of the poor.45 Perhaps most famously to 
legal scholars, Ronald Dworkin gave the examples of Derek and 
Amartya.46 Derek is poor, and Amartya is rich. Derek has a book 
that Amartya would like. Because of his poverty, Derek would be 
willing to part with the book, which he holds dearly, for $2. 
Amartya, though he is not very interested in the book, is willing 
to pay $3 for the book due to his great wealth. Thus, Dworkin 
points out that it would be efficiency-maximizing for the 
government to take the book from poor Derek and give it to rich 
 
 42 See, for example, Hicks, 8 Rev Econ Stud at 111 (cited in note 6) (arguing that, if 
society adopted all policies that met the K-H criterion, then “there would be a strong prob-
ability that almost all [individuals] would be better off after the lapse of a sufficient length 
of time”); Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed, 15 
J Econ Perspectives 199, 202–04 (2001) (explaining Hicks’s original view, which came to 
be known as the “classical creed”); Hotelling, 6 Econometrica at 267–69 (cited in note 6); 
Zerbe and Scott, (Almost) Everybody Wins at *5–7 (cited in note 6) (providing a recent 
statement of the view). 
 43 See, for example, Sperling, How to Refloat These Boats (cited in note 7). 
 44 See, for example, Jacob Pramuk, Clinton: Trump Would Cut Taxes for the Rich in 
“Trumped Up” Trickle Down Economics (CNBC, Sept 26, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5MZS-R33K. 
 45 See, for example, Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? at 9–10 (cited in 
note 9) (describing a focus on efficiency as a key element in neoliberalism); Clive Barnett, 
Publics and Markets: What’s Wrong with Neoliberalism?, in Susan J. Smith, et al, ed, The 
SAGE Handbook of Social Geographies 269, 289–92 (2010) (critiquing neoliberalism’s fo-
cus on efficiency); George Monbiot, Neoliberalism—The Ideology at the Root of All Our 
Problems (The Guardian, Apr 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/L2D7-3DNE (same). 
 46 Dworkin, 9 J Legal Stud at 197–200 (cited in note 8). 
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Amartya, even without compensation.47 Rich Amartya is getting 
something from the government just because he’s rich, not 
because his well-being is enhanced more by having it. 
This analysis is helpful so far as it goes—especially for mak-
ing Dworkin’s point that utility and efficiency are quite different 
things. But it—along with other analyses from economists48—
leaves many questions unanswered, as it is just one example that 
does not extend to the huge range of issues to which efficiency 
analysis is applied. How broad is the critique? Are there excep-
tions? Is this just a narrow case?49 Tracing out more precisely the 
distributive implications of efficient policymaking is the task of 
this Article. 
II.  THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLICIES:  
A STICKY TAKE 
Law and economics typically justifies the goal of maximizing 
efficiency by arguing that efficiency actually promotes social wel-
fare maximization because efficient policies maximize the size of 
the pie that can then be redistributed through taxes. The leading 
law and economics textbooks make an argument along these 
lines.50 Thus, there has been little reason for systematic study of 
distributional impacts of efficient policies, even as efficiency has 
become the goal of much policymaking and analysis; those distri-
butional impacts have been taken not to matter because they are 
offset by other policies. This Part explains this conventional rea-
soning and then turns to the alternative “sticky distribution” as-
sumption introduced in this Article.51 
The idea that all policies except tax policy should ignore dis-
tributional effects is long-standing and has an impressive list of 
 
 47 Id at 200. 
 48 See id at 682–84 (cited in note 13) (offering an example with a similar “bias” in 
favor of the rich); Baker, 5 Phil & Pub Aff at 16–19 (cited in note 8). 
 49 For example, in many markets, Derek and Amartya already would have traded, 
eliminating the opportunity for the efficiency-enhancing government intervention that 
Dworkin critiques. So is there no problem then, as long as people can trade on their own? 
 50 See Cooter and Ulen, Law & Economics at 8 (cited in note 2); Polinsky, An Intro-
duction to Law and Economics at 9–10 (cited in note 15) (“[E]fficiency should be the prin-
cipal criterion for evaluating the legal system. . . . [I]t is often impossible to redistribute 
income through the choice of legal rules and [ ], even when it is possible, redistribution 
through the government’s tax and transfers system may be cheaper and is likely to be 
more precise.”). See also note 2. 
 51 See notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
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proponents, including Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson,52 founda-
tional scholar of modern public finance Richard A. Musgrave,53 
and leading law and economics scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell.54 The classic argument for this idea in law and economics 
comes from Kaplow and Shavell. They introduced the “double dis-
tortion” argument that adopting an inefficient legal rule to bene-
fit the poor by giving the poor larger damages in torts results in 
two distortions: both to the behavior being regulated (roads that 
are “too safe” because of damages that are larger than efficient) 
and to income earning (people have an incentive to earn less so 
that they can get larger damages).55 In an argument that has gen-
erated disagreement56 but is not the subject of this Article, they 
say that it is typically welfare-enhancing to adopt the efficient 
rule and then redistribute through taxes.57 The taxes distort, but 
they result in only one distortion instead of two, thereby enhanc-
ing welfare. 
To lay observers, a more familiar example of this argument 
comes from trade policy. The longtime refrain from economists of 
(nearly) all stripes has been that countries should adopt free 
trade, notwithstanding potentially negative impacts on the poor, 
because trade increases the size of the economic pie, and those 
gains can be redistributed to the poor through taxes and trans-
fers.58 Both the Kaplow-Shavell torts example and the trade ex-
ample are driven by the same two-step reasoning: everyone can 
 
 52 See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev 
Econ & Stat 387 (1954). 
 53 See Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance at 18 (cited in note 15). 
 54 See Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 674–75 (cited in note 15). Kaplow and 
Shavell were building on earlier work by Professors Aanund Hylland and Richard 
Zeckhauser. See Hylland and Zeckhauser, 81 Scandinavian J Econ at 282 (cited in note 
15). The work ultimately builds on Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design 
of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J Pub Econ 55, 67–70 (1976) (arguing 
that, under many circumstances, labor income taxation should be the only means of 
redistribution). 
 55 See Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 669–74 (cited in note 15). 
 56 See, for example, Liscow, 123 Yale L J at 2486–88 (cited in note 18) (disagreeing 
with the contention that redistribution through taxes is nearly always most efficient); 
Sanchirico, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1069–70 (cited in note 18) (similar); Gerrit De Geest, 
Removing Rents: Why the Legal System Is Superior to the Income Tax at Reducing Income 
Inequality *32–33 (Washington University in St Louis Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No 13-10-02, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/WZ3M-EANP (arguing that legal 
rules are more efficient than taxes and transfers at reducing income inequality if the 
inequality is caused by rents). 
 57 Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 677 (cited in note 15). 
 58 See, for example, N. Gregory Mankiw, et al, An Open Letter (Greg Mankiw’s Blog, 
Mar 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T7CF-S8XS (open letter from more than a dozen 
prominent economists to congressional leaders arguing that “[t]rade is beneficial for our 
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be made better off through efficient nontax policies plus taxes and 
transfers. 
An assumption about politics that is typically implicit under-
lies this analysis: those taxes and transfers actually happen so 
that the political system will recover a fair distribution of income. 
This Article calls this the “distributional offset” assumption. As 
Kaplow notes: “There may exist a sort of political equilibrium re-
garding the extent of redistribution. Thus, there may be a ten-
dency for policies—perhaps not individually, but taken as a whole 
over a period of time—to be implemented in a distribution-neutral 
fashion.”59 In other words, normal democratic processes like vot-
ing will yield offsetting distributional consequences because vot-
ers have preferences for a certain distribution of income and will 
thus seek to have any distributional consequences of policy 
changes offset.60 
To be clear, few explicitly assert that the distributional offset 
assumption actually is true. The more common explicit claim in 
canonical texts is that taxes should be used, rather than that they 
are used—a normative claim rather than a positive one.61 But law 
and economics analysis that recommends efficient policies de 
facto makes that assumption implicitly; if the distributional offset 
assumption does not hold, then the logic that the distributional 
consequences do not matter breaks down. For example, an effi-
cient policy may hurt the poor but benefit the rich by more than 
it hurts the poor. To those who want to promote social welfare, or 
other social goals, this policy may not be desirable if the distribu-
tional offset assumption does not hold. 
And indeed, other traditions, in political science and else-
where, suggest the reasonableness of a “sticky distribution” as-
sumption—that is, that distributional consequences are not off-
set.62 A full description of this scholarship is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it is worth sketching some reasons for why policy 
 
society as a whole, but the benefits are unevenly distributed,” and yet “economy-wide ben-
efits resulting from increased trade provide resources,” which can be used to “help[ ] those 
who are adversely affected”); Robert Whaples, The Policy Views of American Economic 
Association Members: The Results of a New Survey, 6 Econ J Watch 337, 340 (2009) (find-
ing support among economists for the position that the United States should continue to 
liberalize trade and increase support for affected workers). 
 59 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 32 (Princeton 2008). 
 60 The logic resembles that in the “median voter theorem,” by which policy approxi-
mates the preferences of the median voter. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy 51–74 (Addison-Wesley 1957). 
 61 See note 2. 
 62 For a recent description of this issue, see Fennell and McAdams, 100 Minn L Rev 
at 1079–1109 (cited in note 19). 
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may not offset distributional consequences to reproduce an opti-
mal distribution of income in the aftermath of a new policy. One 
reason is that inertia could arise from a variety of sources, includ-
ing the many veto points that could thwart democratic will.63 In-
ertia is aided by the population’s ignorance (possibly rational ig-
norance64) of the specifics of how policies change.65 As a result, an 
agency or court could make law with distributional consequences 
that long endure. The distributional consequences over the short 
and medium run matter in addition to those over the long run; for 
example, with an 8 percent discount rate, a ten-year delay in off-
set is closer to no offset than immediate offset.66 
Furthermore, the public choice approach raises the question 
of whether that long run point will ever arrive. Public choice mod-
els how economic interests organize themselves to exert influence 
over policy outcomes through lobbying, donations, and other 
mechanisms.67 For example, Professor Mancur Olson describes 
how, given the costs of collective action, small groups with con-
centrated interests tend to prevail over larger groups with more 
diffuse interests.68 Groups that receive benefits through policies, 
efficient or otherwise, may constitute just such entrenched inter-
ests, and it may be difficult to use taxes and transfers to benefit 
more diffuse losers from a policy change. Indeed, to the extent 
 
 63 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 
J L, Econ & Org 756, 758–59 (2012) (listing the many veto points—at least nine—that 
arise when producing new federal legislation). 
 64 See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy at 207–59 (cited in note 60) (de-
scribing how it may be rational to be ignorant of policy changes because of the high costs 
of informing one’s self relative to the benefits of doing so for any given individual, even if 
the collective benefits are substantial). 
 65 See Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad 
Policies 1–4 (Princeton 2007) (describing how uninformed many voters are). See also 
Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government 267–96 (Princeton 2016) (arguing that voters’ stated 
preferences are incoherent and irrational). But see Vanessa Williamson, Public Ignorance 
or Elitist Jargon? Reconsidering Americans’ Overestimates of Government Waste and 
Foreign Aid *13 (Am Polit Rsrch OnlineFirst, Feb 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/Y8J8-
WZKY (arguing that voters’ “ignorance” of government policies is a result of the jargon 
employed by elites). 
 66 The present discounted value of $1 ten years from now is only $0.46 and thus closer 
to the $0 value of receiving $1 infinitely far in the future. 
 67 See William N. Eskridge Jr, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regu-
lation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 43 (West 5th ed 2014) (describing public 
choice models). 
 68 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups 35 (Harvard 1965) (“In small groups with common interests there is accordingly a 
surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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that higher-income groups receive benefits, there is evidence (ad-
mittedly contested69) suggesting that the preferences of lower- 
income groups matter little for policymaking and that instead 
only the preferences of higher-income groups matter.70 
Empirically, little is known about whether the distributional 
impacts of various institutions’ policy choices stick. One piece of 
evidence shows that, after state courts order increases in school 
funding that largely benefit the poor, the distributional conse-
quences are not offset at all through taxes or spending, even dec-
ades afterwards.71 This evidence is consistent with the sticky dis-
tribution assumption but not the distributional offset assumption. 
Other evidence on the response to court orders on prison spending 
points the other way: those court orders appear to be funded by 
cuts to programs benefitting low-income individuals.72 
We don’t know the answer to what the best assumption about 
politics is, and this Article does not take a stand either way. But 
there is at minimum a plausible case that distributional conse-
quences will not be fully offset. In any case, the correct assump-
tion probably varies depending on institutional context, a point 
that this Article returns to in Part V. For now, instead of assum-
ing that the distributional impacts of policies are completely off-
set elsewhere, this Article adopts the sticky distribution assump-
tion. The stakes for this Article are that, unlike under the 
conventional assumption, the distributional impacts of efficient 
policies matter. 
 
 69 See Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 13 
Perspectives on Polit 1053, 1058 (2015) (finding that politicians’ actions tend to align with 
the views of the middle class); Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences about American Politics: 
A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result, 2 Rsrch & Polit 1, 6 (2015) (criticizing the conclusion 
that politics is dominated by the preferences of the wealthy); J. Alexander Branham, 
Stuart N. Soroka, and Christopher Wlezien, When Do the Rich Win?, 132 Polit Science Q 
43, 54–56 (2017) (same). 
 70 See Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Perspectives on Polit 564, 576 (2014) 
(claiming to show empirically that American policymakers respond almost exclusively to 
the preferences of the economically advantaged). 
 71 See Liscow, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud at 10–11, 18 (cited in note 19) (producing 
such empirical evidence). 
 72 See Richard T. Boylan and Naci Mocan, Intended and Unintended Consequences 
of Prison Reform, 30 J L, Econ & Org 558, 569–72 (2013) (showing that increases in cor-
rectional expenditures correlate with decreases in welfare cash expenditures). 
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III.  LEGAL ENTITLEMENT NEUTRALITY 
With that assumption about politics, this Article asks: What 
are the distributional consequences of efficient policies? In partic-
ular, this Article asks whether efficient policies satisfy the novel 
but intuitive concept of legal entitlement neutrality. This Article 
defines “legal entitlement neutrality” as follows: as one’s income 
increases, efficiency-maximizing policies are no more or less likely 
to systematically endow one with legal entitlements (including 
goods, services, or money). (See the Appendix Section B for a 
mathematical definition.) In other words, legal entitlement neu-
trality is a question of how stuff is allocated. For example, if you 
get richer (but stay the same otherwise), do efficient legal rules 
give you more of an entitlement to clean air? Some may find neu-
trality an important minimum threshold that courts and agencies 
should satisfy because, if the distributional consequences of poli-
cies stick, then systematically regressive policies would exacer-
bate inequality. In other words, some may believe that judges and 
administrative rulemakers ought not be concerned with redistri-
bution and should be neutral with respect to the rich and the poor. 
This Part shows that the answer to this question about whether 
policies satisfy legal entitlement neutrality turns crucially on the 
type of policy under consideration. 
Legal entitlement neutrality naturally divides policies into 
three types. Neutral efficient policies do not change their distri-
bution of legal entitlements to individuals as their income in-
creases. Rich-biased efficient policies distribute more of a legal 
entitlement to individuals as their income increases. Poor-biased 
efficient policies distribute less of a legal entitlement to individu-
als as their income increases. (The Appendix defines these terms 
mathematically.) As this Part explains, efficiency analysis places 
a heavy thumb on the scales in favor of rich-biased policies. This 
Part offers examples of each type of policy in turn and then re-
turns to the generalization of legal entitlement neutrality. The 
Appendix provides a simple (and novel) formula for understand-
ing what utility functions yield which type of policy and includes 
graphical representations to help understand the intuition be-
hind this formula. 
Before moving on, four clarifications are in order. First, legal 
entitlement neutrality is a feature of efficient policies; policies 
that are not efficient are not part of the categorization. Second, 
legal entitlement neutrality is not a question of whether, in any 
individual case, an efficient policy benefits richer people or poorer 
people. For example, as this Article shows, there may be a tort in 
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which a poor person wins, but the legal rule is still neutral. Ra-
ther, the question is one of systematic bias as a matter of the 
methodology of efficiency. Third, legal entitlement neutrality is 
primarily a question of fairness, not utility. Utility can of course 
be implicated when people of different income groups receive dif-
ferent legal entitlements—and this Part discusses those implica-
tions. But one need not think in utility terms to appreciate the 
insight. Fourth, categorization is an empirical question and is one 
that uses tools already common (though imperfect) in cost-benefit 
analysis. Through the various methods that currently are used—
such as surveying affected parties or using their market behavior 
as proxies73—analysts can measure how willingness to pay 
changes with income.74 The answer to that question determines 
categorization: for rich-biased rules, willingness to pay increases 
as income increases; for neutral rules, willingness to pay stays 
the same; and for poor-biased rules, willingness to pay decreases 
at higher incomes.  
The following Sections focus on two examples of the tort of 
nuisance––one neutral and one rich-biased. Both examples apply 
the “Hand formula”75 in determining whether a polluting factory 
has failed to meet its duty of care and is thus negligent, requiring 
it to pay damages; essentially, the costs and benefits of the harm 
are compared. A polluter pays the cost of its harm if and only if 
its pollution is inefficient—in other words, if the costs exceed the 
benefits of the pollution. (A similar analysis could be conducted 
with federal rulemaking, in deciding whether a rule should be im-
posed.) A plaintiff receiving damages is equivalent to receiving a 
 
 73 See, for example, Anthony E. Boardman, et al, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and 
Practice 353–54, 372 (Prentice Hall 4th ed 2011) (describing empirical cost-benefit meth-
ods—such as “contingent valuation,” which surveys people about their willingness to pay, 
and “hedonic pricing,” which uses the prices that people pay for things in the market, such 
as housing in neighborhoods with clean air—to infer the willingness to pay for goods not 
traded in markets, such as clean air). 
 74 There is a large empirical literature on the “income elasticity of willingness to 
pay,” which is a measure of how the amount that people are willing to pay for things 
changes with income. See, for example, Nicholas E. Flores and Richard T. Carson, The 
Relationship between the Income Elasticities of Demand and Willingness to Pay, 33 J Envir 
Econ & Mgmt 287, 294 (1997) (describing the concept). 
 75 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) 
(introducing the Hand formula). The Hand formula is named after Judge Learned Hand, 
who decided the case. Hand used the terminology of comparing the benefits with the loss 
times the probability of loss. 
2018] Is Efficiency Biased? 1669 
legal entitlement—the legal right not to have happen to her what-
ever the defendant was doing.76 This Article compares the effi-
cient legal treatment of poor and rich people being polluted on, 
first in a neutral context, with the factory polluting on a laundro-
mat, and then in a rich-biased context, with the factory polluting 
on homeowners. 
A goal of this Article is to show that, while the two examples 
may seem similar, they are actually examples of different catego-
ries of legal rules with very different implications for distribution 
and potentially very different policy implications. Although the 
focus is on the contrast between neutral and rich-biased rules, 
this Article then briefly discusses poor-biased policies, which are 
uncommon. This Part then turns to the predominance of rich bias 
in efficient policymaking, which this Article calls the “rich get 
richer” principle. Finally, this Part shows how to understand 
these results within a utility framework. 
A. Neutral Policies 
Consider first the neutral case in which the income of the 
owner of a laundromat—the party being polluted—does not mat-
ter for the efficient legal rule. Like the owner of the factory, the 
owner of the laundromat is profit-maximizing. To stop the emis-
sion of pollution, the factory can install pollution scrubbers at a 
cost of $5,000 in reduced profits. Thus, the factory’s willingness 
to pay for the benefit of emitting the pollution is the $5,000 that 
the factory saves by not putting in the scrubbers. 
Of the two possible laundromat owners, start with the rich 
one. With the pollution, she needs to purchase an air purifier for 
$10,000 to produce acceptably clean clothes.77 As a result, the 
laundromat’s willingness to pay to avoid the cost of the pollution 
is $10,000 in reduced profits. The Hand formula’s efficiency 
analysis compares the costs and benefits of the pollution, asking: 
Is it efficient for the polluter to put in the scrubbers? If yes, then 
the factory is found to have failed to meet its duty of care; it is 
then held negligent and must pay damages. 
 
 76 For simplicity, assume that there is no Coasean bargaining, as may be realistic in 
a case with a polluter polluting on many individuals who may find it difficult to negotiate 
collectively with a firm. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 
15 (1960). 
 77 The decision to install the scrubbers is a binary choice, and the air purifier and 
scrubbers are fixed costs. 
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Because pollution’s cost ($10,000) exceeds its benefits 
($5,000), the efficient legal rule is to impose liability on the fac-
tory, holding it negligent in the amount of $10,000. As a result, 
the factory faces $10,000 in damages from not installing the 
scrubbers, but needs to pay only $5,000 to install them, so the 
negligence rule thereby incentivizes the factory to install the 
scrubbers in the shadow of this prospective rule. Thus, the laun-
dromat de facto has the right to clean air in this case. Column (1) 
of Table 1 summarizes these facts, with the willingness to pay 
(WTP) of each party and the resulting efficient legal rule. 
Compare that case of a rich owner of the laundromat with the 
case in which every fact is the same, except that the owner of the 
identical laundromat is poor. The factory owner still has a cost of 
$5,000 for installing the scrubbers, so its willingness to pay for 
the pollution is $5,000. And the cost of the pollution to the laun-
dromat owner is still the need to install an air purifier, which 
costs $10,000, so her willingness to pay to avoid the pollution is 
$10,000. The WTP numbers for both parties are the same: the 
costs of the pollution ($10,000 for the air purifier) exceed the ben-
efits of the pollution ($5,000 for the scrubbers). As a result, the 
outcome is the same: the factory is negligent. It needs to pay dam-
ages, and the laundromat owner has the right to the clean air, as 
summarized in Column (2) of Table 1. 
What drives the analysis is that the laundromat owner’s will-
ingness to pay does not change with her income. A poor owner has 
the same willingness to pay to avoid pollution as a rich owner 
does: the cost of installing the air purifier. Thus, regardless of her 
income, the laundromat owner’s willingness to pay to avoid the 
pollution is still $10,000.78 As a result, the same analysis applies 
even though the owner is poor. In this context, the negligence rule 
is a neutral rule. 
 
 78 Note that these examples do not consider whether the poor laundromat owner can 
borrow to cover the cost of the purifiers if she does not have the cash on hand. This ap-
proach makes sense because the analysis involves only hypothetical willingness to pay, so 
the laundromat owner does not actually need to pay. In principle, difficulty with borrowing 
could affect measured willingness to pay. But in practice, it is likely that real-world cost-
benefit analysis would not take into account liquidity constraints but rather would take 
$1 in profits to be worth $1. Similarly, the examples implicitly assume (as is typical in 
economics) that business owners are risk-neutral; the example does this by making the 
outcomes certain. If business owners were risk-averse, then they would not be willing to 
pay $1 with certainty in exchange for a 50 percent probability of receiving $2 and a 50 
percent probability of receiving $0. Either of these issues—borrowing constraints and risk-
aversion with uncertainty—could potentially make poorer people less inclined to actually 
pay $1 to receive an expected $1. 
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TABLE 1:  NEUTRAL LEGAL RULE OUTCOME 
Plaintiff income (1) Rich (2) Poor 
Plaintiff WTP to 
avoid pollution 
$10,000 $10,000 
Factory WTP to 
pollute 
$5,000 $5,000 
Receives legal  
entitlement (has 
higher WTP) 
Plaintiff  
(laundromat) 
Plaintiff  
(laundromat) 
Outcome Factory faces  
damages and  
installs scrubbers 
Factory faces  
damages and  
installs scrubbers 
More basically, rich and poor people have the same willing-
ness to pay for a dollar of profit: one dollar. Indeed, it is generally 
the case that contexts in which dollars are all that matter—most 
prominently, when profits are all that matter to the parties in-
volved—lead to neutral legal rules. Such rules are present, for ex-
ample, in the contract or corporate law that governs relations be-
tween two businesses, financial regulation, or the panoply of 
other areas in which only money itself matters. In this example, 
the income of the owners of the laundromat doesn’t matter for 
their legal entitlement to clean air. They have the same willing-
ness to pay to avoid the cost of the air purifier: $10,000 because 
$10,000 is worth $10,000 to both a rich and a poor person. As a 
result, the legal rule treats rich and poor people the same. 
Finally, consider two aspects of the economic pie, the size of 
which neutral efficient legal rules are maximizing. First, this eco-
nomic pie consists of money. When the efficient legal rule is 
adopted, the economy produces more dollars. In this example, 
with the efficient legal rule, instead of forcing the laundromat to 
spend $10,000 on an air purifier, the factory installs the scrubbers 
for $5,000, producing an extra $5,000 of money. Second, any given 
policy may benefit the rich or benefit the poor. For example, poor 
people benefit from the rule if the laundromat owners are poor, 
and rich people benefit if the laundromat owners are rich. But 
across a large number of efficient policies, the distributional im-
pacts of such neutral legal rules could plausibly even out. Because 
any individual efficient legal rule has no bias, in aggregate many 
such rules may not have systematic distributional impacts. 
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B. Rich-Biased Policies 
Contrast this neutral context with a rich-biased context. Sup-
pose that the same factory is involved with the same pollution and 
the same potential air scrubbers. But suppose that, instead of pol-
luting a laundromat, the factory is polluting homeowners whose 
health is harmed by the smog caused by the pollution.79 (To make 
the example as stark as possible, assume that the pollution makes 
people feel ill but does not harm their productivity as workers.) 
Consider the efficient liability rule here.80 Once again, start with 
a rich person. Rich people tend to be willing to pay a relatively 
large amount for amenities like clean air that produce good 
health.81 Suppose that a rich person is willing to pay $10,000 for 
clean air. Because the costs and benefits are the same as the two 
cases (rich and poor) involving the laundromat, the same efficient 
legal rule results. The $10,000 in costs from the pollution exceeds 
the $5,000 in benefits from the pollution, so liability is imposed 
on the polluter. In the shadow of this liability, the factory will 
install the scrubbers, and the homeowner will have the right to 
clean air. See Column (1) in Table 2 describing this scenario. 
  
 
 79 For purposes of the example, assume that the rich and the poor live in identical 
houses except with respect to pollution. Also, put aside capitalization into housing prices. 
That is, assume perfectly elastic housing supply, such that the price of housing equals the 
cost of construction, so that better or worse views won’t affect housing prices. Of course, 
in reality, richer people will tend to live in fancier homes with prices that will likely be 
affected more by pollution (and thus receive higher damages, the way that a higher-paid 
person receives higher damages when a tort stops her from working), but considering 
housing values adds complexity without changing the underlying analysis. 
 80 In practice, torts typically do not offer any relief to those whose quality of life is 
harmed by worse health but who suffer no financial harm, such as compensation for pain 
and suffering, in ways that give more compensation to the rich than to the poor. Dan B. 
Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 479 (West 2d ed 2017). 
But this Article is nevertheless describing the K-H efficient legal rule. A more realistic 
case would probably involve federal rulemaking. The nuisance case is used here to create 
a clear contrast with the efficient neutral rule. 
 81 See Kristrom and Riera, 7 Envir & Res Econ at 47–48 (cited in note 23). 
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TABLE 2:  RICH-BIASED LEGAL RULE OUTCOME 
Plaintiff income (1) Rich (2) Poor 
Plaintiff WTP to 
avoid pollution 
$10,000 $2,500 
Factory WTP to  
pollute 
$5,000 $5,000 
Receives legal  
entitlement (has 
higher WTP) 
Plaintiff  
(homeowner) 
Defendant  
(factory) 
Outcome Factory faces  
damages and  
installs scrubbers 
Homeowner  
polluted on without 
compensation 
Contrast a rich homeowner with a poor homeowner, again 
with everything the same except for the income of the home-
owner. Poor homeowners tend to be willing to pay less for ameni-
ties like clean air. Poor homeowners have limited funds; they 
have little that they are willing to spend on clean air because they 
have more pressing things to spend money on—things that the 
rich themselves have already purchased. Suppose, for example, 
that the poor homeowner would be willing to pay $2,500 for the 
clean air. Then the efficient legal rule reverses: it is not efficient 
to impose liability on the factory because the $2,500 cost of the 
pollution is less than the $5,000 benefit of the factory not in-
stalling the air scrubbers. As a result, the poor homeowner is pol-
luted on without compensation. See Column (2) in Table 2 de-
scribing this scenario. 
In other words, the rich homeowner but not the poor home-
owner has the right to clean air—even though the rich home-
owner pays nothing for the right. The liability rule in this context 
is rich-biased because it is systematically more likely to allocate 
clean air to the rich than to the poor. This is because the rich are 
more likely to have a willingness to pay for clean air in excess of 
the $5,000 cost of installing scrubbers. Homeowners do not pay 
for the policy, but rich homeowners get the clean air, and poor 
ones do not. Neutral rules, on the other hand, exhibit no such bias; 
some may benefit poorer people (for example, when the laundro-
mat owner was poor), and some may benefit richer people (for ex-
ample, when the laundromat owner was rich), but there’s not a 
systematic bias across legal rules because income does not matter 
for legal entitlement allocation. 
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Consider again the economic pie, the size of which the rich-
biased policy is maximizing. For rich-biased policies, unlike neu-
tral policies, money does not constitute the economic pie. We 
know this because, for the cases of both the rich and poor home-
owners, the cost of the scrubbers for the factory—the only money 
involved in the example because the valuation of good health does 
not affect anything financial—is the same: $5,000. Yet the effi-
cient outcomes are different: the rich get the clean air, and the 
poor do not. 
It is also not utility that is in the economic pie. It is plausible 
to think that the rich and the poor have the same utility from 
clean air. On that assumption, if it is utility-maximizing for the 
rich to have clean air, then it is also utility-maximizing for the 
poor to have clean air. (Part III.F illustrates this argument with 
an example.) Yet the poor do not get clean air in the example, 
meaning that this efficient arrangement is not necessarily utility-
maximizing. 
Rather, the economic pie for rich-biased efficient polices, as 
for all efficient policies, is made up of fictitious willingness to pay 
units. Let’s call them “WTPs.” For rich-biased policies, basing pol-
icy on maximizing the sum of WTPs disadvantages the poor, be-
cause the poor can generally afford to pay less for things. Effec-
tively, the preferences of the poor count less than the preferences 
of the rich for making the WTP pie bigger because the rich are 
willing to pay more. That disparity is why, even if the rich and 
the poor have the same dislike of air pollution, when maximizing 
the size of the economic pie, the rich receive a legal entitlement 
to clean air while the poor do not. 
This bias would matter little if rich-biased policies were rare. 
But policies that would be rich-biased if they are efficient are 
ubiquitous among the things that governments provide because 
the rich tend to be willing to pay more than the poor for goods. 
Indeed, as Appendix Section D shows, rich-biased goods are 
equivalent to what economists call “normal” goods, in which de-
mand increases with income. Here are some examples: 
• Siting polluting facilities: The main examples in this 
Section concern tort law and the decision of polluters to 
install pollution control equipment. State and local 
governments also have direct approval authority over 
siting polluting facilities, with similar consequences for 
pollution in rich versus poor areas: siting more factories in 
poor areas than in rich ones would be efficient because the 
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poor (in many cases) have a lower willingness to pay to 
avoid pollution.82 
• Public spending on pharmaceutical research: Rich people’s 
greater willingness to pay for their health makes it effi-
cient to fund more research on diseases that afflict the rich 
than those that afflict the poor—both within countries 
and, even more starkly, between countries.83 
• Road safety: The rich are likely willing to pay more for safe 
roads, suggesting efficient torts and spending policies that 
impose greater penalties when the well-off are harmed 
and greater public spending in rich areas to avoid such 
outcomes.84 
• Spending on law enforcement and voting: Local govern-
ments choosing which neighborhoods receive more money 
for law enforcement or infrastructure (for example, per-
sonnel or machines) to make voting quicker face an inher-
ent bias: rich people are willing to spend more for a mar-
ginal decrease in crime or to spend less time voting.85 
• Infrastructure like parks or transportation: Legislatures 
decide whether to build public infrastructure and may 
choose to do so in richer neighborhoods that have a higher 
willingness to pay. Take the example of parks in a rich 
versus a poor neighborhood. The efficient policy is likely to 
build more parks in rich neighborhoods than in poor 
ones.86 And legislatures also decide between funding bus 
mass transit (often used by lower-income individuals, who 
 
 82 See, for example, Edward B. Barbier, Mikolaj Czajkowski, and Nick Hanley, Is the 
Income Elasticity of the Willingness to Pay for Pollution Control Constant?, 68 Envir & Res 
Econ 663, 675 (2016) (reporting exclusively increasing willingness to pay with income for 
environmental improvements); Kristrom and Riera, 7 Envir & Res Econ at 47 (cited in 
note 23). 
 83 See James K. Hammitt and Lisa A. Robinson, The Income Elasticity of the Value 
per Statistical Life: Transferring Estimates between High and Low Income Populations, 2 
J Benefit-Cost Analysis 1, 13–14 (2011) (measuring far higher implied willingness to pay 
for an extra year of life among rich than among poor populations). 
 84 See id at 1–3. 
 85 See Claudia D. Solari, Affluent Neighborhood Persistence and Change in U.S. Cit-
ies, 11 City & Community 370, 383 (2012) (noting that affluent neighborhoods can better 
afford good policing to lower crime rates). 
 86 One feature that could change this calculus is if poorer people are more densely 
located together than richer people, such that it may be efficient to build a park for the 
poorer people but not the richer people: even if the willingness to pay of each poor person 
is less than that of the rich person, in aggregate, there may be a higher willingness to pay 
for the poor people. 
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have a lower willingness to pay) and airports (used on av-
erage by higher-income individuals):87 efficient policies 
will systematically spend more on what rich people want 
than what poor people want even if a given amount of 
spending would increase well-being for the rich and the 
poor by the same amount. 
This list could go on. Anecdotally, there is some evidence that, 
in at least some of these cases, in practice the rich do benefit rel-
ative to the poor, who may, for example, be subject to more pollu-
tion (at least globally),88 less public pharmaceutical research 
spending that benefits them,89 more dangerous roads,90 less 
 
 87 See The Value of Travel Time Savings: Departmental Guidance for Conducting 
Economic Evaluations Revision 2 (2016 Update) *7 (US Department of Transportation, 
Sept 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2F7Z-5MWL (describing federal regulatory 
guidance based on richer people having a higher willingness to pay for some transporta-
tion improvements). See also notes 117–19. 
 88 See Robert D. Bullard, Dismantling Environmental Racism in the USA, 4 Loc 
Envir 5, 8 (1999) (presenting evidence that people of color and low-income persons have 
borne greater environmental and health risks than society at large). Consider Vicki Been, 
What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally 
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L Rev 1001, 1014–15 (1993) (pointing out weaknesses 
in the evidence showing that the siting process for Locally Undesirable Land Uses 
produces a disproportionate number of sites in low-income or minority neighborhoods, but 
ultimately concluding that legislatures should address the fairness of siting decisions). 
 89 See James Love and Tim Hubbard, An Agenda for Research and Development: 
Meeting on the Role of Generics and Local Industry in Attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines *2 (The World Bank, June 
24–25, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/B7CL-5HMV (describing the “widely 
acknowledged” idea that “there is too little investment in [research and development] for 
diseases that primarily afflict the poor”); Patrice Trouiller, et al, Drug Development for 
Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 The Lancet 
2188, 2189 (2002) (showing “that only 1 [percent] of the 1393 new chemical entities 
marketed between 1975 and 1999 were” for tropical diseases primarily afflicting the poor); 
Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
*11–12 (Médecins Sans Frontières, Sept 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/3UAR-QJ2A 
(discussing results from a 2001 survey of eleven top pharmaceutical companies that show 
that the pipeline of new drug development for neglected diseases is “virtually empty”). But 
see Philip Stevens, Diseases of Poverty and the 10/90 Gap *11 (International Policy 
Network, Nov 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/9A9Q-GHM9 (arguing that the health 
problems faced by the world’s poorest populations are caused by lack of access to vital 
medications and that this dearth in supply may be attributed to governmental taxing and 
spending priorities). 
 90 See Patrick Morency, et al, Neighborhood Social Inequalities in Road Traffic In-
juries: The Influence of Traffic Volume and Road Design, 102 Am J Pub Health 1112, 1113–
14 (2012) (finding a statistical relationship between neighborhood socioeconomic position 
and the number of people injured at intersections). See also Sarah Fecht, Accident-Zone: 
Poorer Neighborhoods Have Less-Safe Road Designs (Scientific American, May 3, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/C5AM-JZUE (“When traffic-calming measures are installed, 
they’re more likely to be located in wealthy neighborhoods.”). 
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spending on law enforcement,91 longer waits to vote,92 worse 
parks,93 and worse transportation infrastructure.94 The point here 
is not that there actually are disproportionate legal entitlements 
going to the rich and the poor—much less that efficiency analysis 
has anything to do with that allocation. Indeed, if more polluting 
facilities are sited in low-income minority neighborhoods, that 
could be because of market forces like lower costs of acquiring 
land, the lack of political power of low-income minority communi-
ties, racism, a focus on efficiency-minded thinking, or other fac-
tors. It is often impossible to know. The point is that efficiency 
would justify such allocations—and that such differences in allo-
cation would be large. For example, a recent analysis conducted 
for the Environmental Protection Agency suggests willingness to 
pay to avoid mortality roughly doubles as income doubles.95 Thus, 
it would be efficient to spend about twice as much to save the life 
of someone earning $120,000 as someone earning $60,000. 
C. Poor-Biased Policies 
It is not the case that willingness to pay always increases or 
stays even with income. Rather, some things become more valua-
ble (in WTP terms) as income goes down, and thus poorer people 
 
 91 See Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Mollie J. Cohen, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Those 
with Darker Skin Report Slower Police Response throughout the Americas (Wash Post, Feb 
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/E5PU-5CK3 (presenting research findings that those 
who live in wealthier neighborhoods report that the police would arrive more quickly than 
those in rural areas and those who are poor). 
 92 See Ralph G. Neas, The New Face of Jim Crow: Voter Suppression in America *14 
(People for the American Way Foundation 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/2U4K-CKQ3 
(arguing that there are longer lines in poorer precincts than in richer ones). But see David 
A. Graham, Here’s Why Black People Have to Wait Twice as Long to Vote as Whites (The 
Atlantic, Apr 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/FK6A-PJZ3 (arguing that race “stands 
out” as a factor likely to cause waiting at the polls and noting that neither household nor 
ZIP code income significantly affected wait times). 
 93 See Dan Gordon, Access to Parks, Open Spaces in Your Community Can Be a 
Health Factor (UCLA Newsroom, Mar 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z9WD-E5E9 
(relaying study findings that there are “wide-ranging disparities between low-income com-
munities and more affluent areas in the quantity and quality of park spaces”). 
 94 See Emily Badger, The Inequality of Sidewalks (Wash Post, Jan 15, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/MXN4-2BZM (describing how poorer neighborhoods are less 
likely to have crosswalks, traffic islands, and sidewalks, reducing safety); Gillian B. White, 
Stranded: How America’s Failing Public Transportation Increases Inequality (The 
Atlantic, May 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BGV8-5RWC (“In many cities, the 
areas with the shoddiest access to public transit are the most impoverished.”). 
 95 Recommended Income Elasticity and Income Growth Estimates: Technical Memo-
randum *2 (Environmental Protection Agency, Feb 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BW2Q-PFEZ (showing that, as income doubles, willingness to pay in-
creases by between 70 percent and 110 percent). Note that the EPA does not in practice 
currently use different WTP figures for those of different incomes. See note 113. 
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get a larger legal entitlement than rich people under the efficient 
policy. As Appendix Section D shows, poor-biased goods are equiv-
alent to what economists term “inferior” goods, for which demand 
increases as income decreases.96 For poor-biased polices, effi-
ciency analysis is also biased but toward poor individuals. An ex-
ample of a poor-biased policy could be spending on bus-based pub-
lic transit. Consider a state transportation authority deciding 
whether to spend more money on buses in a poor city or a rich city 
of equal populations, each of which currently receives the same 
amount of state spending on buses. The transportation authority 
conducts its analysis to determine which city is willing to pay 
more for the increased spending. It may be that the poor city ac-
tually has the greater willingness to pay for the spending on buses 
because rich people—though they are willing to pay more for most 
things—are not willing to pay more for buses for the simple rea-
son that they wouldn’t use the buses. They already own their own 
cars and prefer to use those, while poor people often do not own 
cars and thus would greatly value the increased availability of 
buses.97 
Poor-biased policies are rare for an intuitive reason: rich peo-
ple have more money to spend! And for those things on which the 
rich spend more money, they must be willing to pay more than 
the poor—or else the rich would not in fact be spending more than 
the poor. Empirical research on willingness to pay backs up this 
intuitive explanation.98 Indeed, it is difficult to think of many 
other plausible examples of poor-biased policies. Another example 
might be efficient spending by a legislature on building public 
swimming pools across communities. Spending more in lower- 
income communities might be efficient if the wealthy would be 
reluctant to use the pools, perhaps because the well-off can opt to 
build their own pools at their homes or in their subdivisions. 
Even with these examples, the poor-biased policies are sub-
categories of larger categories of rich-biased policies. Buses are a 
subcategory of transportation infrastructure, and pools are a sub-
category of public amenities infrastructure. That is not a coinci-
dence. In any broad category of efficiency-oriented policy, like 
transportation infrastructure or public amenities, the rich are 
 
 96 Varian, Microeconomic Analysis at 117 (cited in note 29). 
 97 Of course, it need not be the case that richer people are unlikely to use buses. For 
example, the bus lines along the high-income thoroughfare of Fifth Avenue in New York 
City carry many well-off individuals. 
 98 See, for example, Kristrom and Riera, 7 Envir & Res Econ at 49 (cited in note 23) 
(showing willingness to pay increasing with income for all environmental goods surveyed). 
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likely willing to pay more by virtue of their greater income. For 
example, the rich may not use buses, but they use roads, bridges, 
and airports—and are willing to pay quite a lot to commute to and 
from their well-paying jobs and to travel on vacations. The poor 
may be willing to spend more on buses but not on infrastructure 
overall. This result makes sense: the rich have more money to 
spend. Across all categories of goods, they must be willing to pay 
more—or else the rich would spend less than the poor. But the 
narrower the subcategory of overall consumption, the more likely 
that there will be something that the poor are actually willing to 
spend more on. When aggregated, however, there likely are few 
categories for which that is true. 
D. Summary 
Table 3 summarizes the examples of neutral, rich-biased, and 
poor-biased rules. The first column has the neutral case, in which 
the legal entitlement is clean air. The laundromat plaintiff cares 
about the clean air because the clean air affects the laundromat’s 
profits. Because everyone values a dollar of profits at a dollar, 
wealthier laundromat owners have the same willingness to pay 
for the clean air as the poorer laundromat owners. As a result, the 
rich do not get more of a legal entitlement. These policies are 
fairly common—whenever legal rules are determined by profits. 
TABLE 3:  SUMMARY OF NEUTRAL, RICH-BIASED, AND  
POOR-BIASED RULES 
 Neutral Rich-Biased Poor-Biased 
Legal 
entitlement 
Clean air Clean air Bus Service 
Why care Profits Health Transportation 
↑ income à 
WTP? 
Same ↑ ↓ 
Rich get 
more legal 
entitlement? 
No Yes Poor get more 
Frequency Common Very common Uncommon 
The second column has the rich-biased legal rule example of 
homeowners being polluted on by the same factory. It involves the 
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same legal entitlement, clean air, as the neutral rule. But the rea-
son that the plaintiffs care is different; in this case, the plaintiffs 
care because of their health. Because richer people tend to be will-
ing to pay more to protect their health, more income means a 
higher willingness to pay. As a result, richer people are more 
likely to receive the legal entitlement, and poorer people are more 
likely to face pollution without compensation. Rich-biased policies 
are ubiquitous because the rich tend to be willing to pay more for 
most things. 
The third column has an example of a poor-biased rule. Here 
the legal entitlement is bus service. People care about it because 
it provides them transportation. It is plausible that more income 
actually decreases willingness to pay for bus service because 
wealthier people already have alternative means of transporta-
tion like cars. As a result, the poor would get more of this legal 
entitlement of transportation spending on bus service. But poli-
cies like this are rare because the rich are typically willing to 
spend more than the poor. 
E. The Predominance of Rich Bias and the “Rich Get Richer” 
Principle 
Two points arise out of this summary. First, whether an 
efficient policy is biased is not as simple as it might seem from 
Dworkin’s rich-biased example of valuing a book.99 Efficient 
policies are not always rich-biased; rather, they can also be 
neutral and even poor-biased. Because the type of bias a policy 
exhibits may affect how one normatively views the policy (as 
Part V discusses), this division is important. Second, the basis of 
efficiency in willingness to pay means that there are likely far 
more rich-biased efficient policies than poor-biased efficient 
policies, resulting in a tendency for efficient policy to favor the 
rich. And this generalization—that a “rich get richer” principle 
underlies efficient policymaking—is key for understanding the 
effect of efficient policymaking in the absence of offsetting taxes 
and transfers. 
Some hedging is necessary here because the overall distribu-
tional impacts of efficient policies (supposing that, for nontax pol-
icies, governments adopt only efficient ones) depends on the areas 
in which governments adopt policies. Suppose, for example, that 
the sole purpose of government (legislative, judicial, and admin-
istrative) is to provide bus service. Then policies overall would be 
 
 99 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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poor-biased. Or suppose that policies affected profits only be-
tween businesses: then policies would be neutral. 
But these hypotheticals do not reflect reality. Government 
policies affect myriad things. Imagine a scale with poor-biased 
policies on one side and rich-biased policies on the other. Neutral 
policies sit at the fulcrum. There may be more or fewer neutral 
policies—and more neutral policies will tend to create an overall 
more neutral distribution of efficiently-distributed legal entitle-
ments. But adding more neutral policies to the fulcrum does not 
change the direction that the scale tilts. The category of neutral 
policies may be large or small; that’s an important area for future 
research, and it matters for the extent of overall bias. But for the 
direction of overall bias, what matters is the share of rich-biased 
versus poor-biased policies. And there is little doubt that govern-
ments affect the distribution of legal entitlements of far more 
rich-biased than poor-biased things. As noted earlier, rich-biased 
efficient policies are ubiquitous, while it is difficult to even come 
up with many examples of poor-biased policies. That is why econ-
omists call such rich-biased goods for which demand increases as 
people’s income increases “normal” goods. So, on the scale of effi-
cient policies, the rich-biased policies likely far outweigh the poor-
biased policies so that the overall distribution is rich-biased. Be-
cause the rich can benefit from these policies for free—without 
paying for them—efficient policy exacerbates inequality. Effi-
ciency thus reinforces the existing wealth distribution: the rich 
get more just because they are rich.  
F. Utility and Legal Entitlement Neutrality 
Although legal entitlement neutrality is a phenomenon based 
on the empirically measurable (at least in principle) willingness 
to pay and need not make any reference to utility functions, some 
may find their intuition aided by explanation in utility terms. 
Those who either do not believe in, or are not very familiar with, 
the declining marginal utility of consumption may wish to skip 
this Section, as it is not necessary for the argument. In particular, 
the Article’s results do not hinge on utility in two ways: First, one 
need make no reference to utility functions to show the predomi-
nance of rich bias. That predominance depends only on higher 
willingness to pay by the rich. Second, one need not care about 
utility to care about the greater allocation to the rich. That said, 
one can understand the predominance of rich bias in utility terms, 
and many who care about utility may be quite concerned about 
rich bias. 
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This Article shows a new result in the Appendix, which is 
that whether a good is rich-biased, neutral, or poor-biased de-
pends on a simple formula comparing two features of the utility 
function: 
A good is rich-biased if and only if the marginal utility of con-
sumption decreases with income more rapidly than the mar-
ginal utility of the good decreases with income.100 
The intuition for this result is as follows: K-H efficiency is 
measured in dollars. Thus, as a person’s income increases, her 
willingness to pay for a good is measured by how much she would 
rather have another unit of that good versus another dollar of 
consumption. This comparison is precisely what determines 
whether a good is rich-biased. 
This formula makes clear that efficient policies are tilted in 
favor of rich-biased policies. The rich get a higher utility from 
some policies, and poor people get a higher utility from other pol-
icies. If the question were who gets a higher utility, then policies 
might be roughly split between those that are rich-biased and 
poor-biased. But that is not the question. Instead, for a policy to 
be poor-biased, the extent to which the poor gain more utility than 
the rich must surpass a big hurdle: the rate at which the utility 
from the policy goes down with increased income must be even 
faster than the rate at which utility from income itself goes down 
with increased income. 
To get a sense of the scope for rich bias, consider a simple 
numerical example. In particular, suppose that a policymaker is 
deciding where to shut down some polluting factories. As might 
happen in this situation, there is no practical way to compensate 
those who are harmed by pollution with the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem. Suppose that there are two communities of equal population 
that are identical, except that those in Richtown each have $9 of 
income and those in Poortown have only $1 of income.101 Suppose 
further that each has the utility function 𝑢 = log	(𝑥) + log	(𝑐), 
where 𝑐 is the amount that individuals consume and 𝑥 is how 
clean the environment is. This utility function (with a declining 
marginal utility of consumption) is a standard assumption in the 
 
 100 The formula also includes a utility “normalization” term. See the Appendix 
Section C for an explanation. 
 101 Also assume that individuals are immobile. 
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economics public finance literature and receives support from he-
donic surveys of income and happiness.102 Suppose that the poli-
cymaker has ten units of “cleanliness” (the opposite of pollution) 
to allocate because of a new technological development. The sta-
tus quo policy is that Richtown and Poortown have one unit of 
cleanliness. (Initially, the environment is very polluted.) This 
setup is rich-biased because the clean air is equally valuable to 
rich and poor people and there is a declining marginal utility of 
consumption. 
Consider allocations to achieve four different goals. First, the 
K-H efficient allocation is zero units of cleanliness for the poor 
and all ten units of cleanliness for the rich. Consumption has a 
declining marginal utility. And because the residents of Richtown 
do not value the marginal unit of consumption very much because 
they are already consuming so much, they are willing and able to 
buy all of the clean air. So all the clean air is allocated to the 
rich—without their having to pay anything for it. 
Second, the allocation maximizing total utility, with no trad-
ing in cleanliness, is to split the cleanliness evenly between the 
two communities. This is because the rich and the poor each have 
the same utility function and the same initial levels of pollution, 
so pollution has the same effect on the utility of both types of in-
dividuals. An additional unit of cleanliness to individuals already 
subject to the same level of pollution affects all of the individuals 
the same. 
Third, consider the allocation maximizing total utility if 
cleanliness rights can be traded in a Coasean fashion.103 Now, 
those units of cleanliness are convertible into money, and the 
marginal utility of income starts to matter. With this utility 
function and income levels, the marginal utility of income is nine 
times as high for the residents of Poortown as for Richtown.104 As 
a result, allocating 9.8 units of cleanliness to the poor and 0.2 to 
the rich maximizes total utility so that the poor people can trade 
 
 102 See Angus Deaton, Income, Health, and Well-Being around the World: Evidence 
from the Gallup World Poll, 22 J Econ Perspectives 53, 56 (2008); Betsey Stevenson and 
Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin 
Paradox *12 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 14282, Aug 2008), 
archived at http://perma.cc/26C9-TKL5. 
 103 This assumption does not affect the efficiency analysis because, if the allocation is 
really K-H efficient, no trading would take place after the allocation anyway. 
 104 With the logarithmic utility function, the marginal utility with respect to con-
sumption is 1/𝑐, meaning that the marginal utility of a dollar of income for the poor person 
is one versus just 1/9 for the rich person. 
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cleanliness with the rich and thereby increase their 
consumption.105 
Fourth, consider an even allocation of cleanliness with trad-
ing. By fiat, each person receives five units of cleanliness. Again, 
because the poor have so little consumption, they trade some of 
their cleanliness to the rich and thereby increase their consump-
tion and utility.106 
TABLE 4:  TOTAL UTILITY WITH VARIOUS ALLOCATIONS OF 
CLEANLINESS 
 Allocation of  
Cleanliness 
Total 
Utility 
Veil of Ignorance: 
% WTP to Avoid 
Efficient  
Allocation 
 Poor Rich 
Efficient  
allocation 
0 10 2.00 0% 
SWF-maximizing 
allocation (no 
trading)107 
5 5 2.51 45% 
SWF-maximizing 
allocation (with 
trading) 
9.8 0.2 2.95 67% 
Even allocation 
(with trading) 
5 5 2.80 61% 
Table 4 lists the sum of utilities under the four allocations. It 
shows how perverse the efficient policy can be if the goal is 
utilitarian and there are no tax-and-transfer offsets. While utility 
can be difficult to interpret, there are large differences in total 
utility among the options. The efficient allocation has the lowest 
utility at 2.00 because both consumption and cleanliness are 
highly unequal, and the individuals have a declining marginal 
utility from both—meaning that (holding total cleanliness and 
 
 105 With a price of $0.83 per unit of cleanliness (see the Appendix Section F for the 
derivation), the residents of Poortown sell 4.8 units of their entitlement to cleanliness to 
the residents of Richtown for $4, yielding complete equality in cleanliness (5 units each) 
and in consumption (also $5 each). 
 106 The price is again $0.83 a unit. As a result of trading, the poor end up with three 
units of cleanliness and $3 of consumption, and the rich end up with seven units of clean-
liness and $7 in consumption. See the Appendix Section F for the derivation. 
 107 SWF stands for social welfare function. For an explanation of SWFs, see note 17. 
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consumption fixed) moving either consumption or cleanliness to 
the less well-off party increases utility. Utility increases to 2.51 
with the utility-maximizing outcome without trading because at 
least the distribution of cleanliness becomes equal. And it 
increases further to 2.91 with the utility-maximizing solution 
with trading because both cleanliness and consumption are 
equally distributed. Under the even allocation with trading—
something not explicitly redistributionist—the total utility (2.80) 
is also substantially higher than under the efficient allocation 
because at least the high-marginal-utility party receives an equal 
share of the cleanliness. 
The rightmost column gives an easier to interpret meaning 
to these differences in utility. Suppose instead that each person 
is behind a veil of ignorance and ask how much of their consump-
tion they would be willing to pay to receive a given allocation in-
stead of the efficient one.108 The differences are huge; an efficient 
allocation is not a good approximation of the utility-maximizing 
allocation. The individuals behind the veil of ignorance would be 
willing to pay 45 percent of their income to be certain to have an 
equal share of cleanliness regardless of their income, 67 percent 
of their income for equality in income and cleanliness as a result 
of a disproportionate endowment to the poor party, and 61 percent 
for an even allocation with trading allowed. 
The example illustrates a key point: policies distribute enti-
tlements (like the right to reduce pollution) that have value.109 If 
taxes and transfers do not respond to the adoption of an efficient 
nontax policy, then the efficient nontax policy may not be neutral. 
The efficient allocation misses an opportunity to use legal entitle-
ments to address existing disparities, as we see in the case of trad-
ability. But more importantly, when this good is allocated, not 
only is the declining marginal utility of income ignored, but also 
the fact that the wealthy tend to have a higher willingness to pay 
for the good will lead systematically to more allocation of the good 
 
 108 In particular, assume that each person has $5 of income and ask how much each 
person would be willing to pay to have a 50 percent chance of being rich and a 50 percent 
chance of being poor in each of the three alternatives instead of the efficient allocation. 
Specifically, solve for 𝑤 in log 5 − log 5 − 𝑤 = 𝐸𝑈./0123.0451 − 𝐸𝑈166474130. That is, I solve 
for the 𝑤 that constitutes what someone behind the veil of ignorance would be willing to 
pay to have the expected utility under an alternative regime 𝐸𝑈./0123.0451  instead of the 
expected utility of the efficient regime 𝐸𝑈166474130 . 
 109 See, for example, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1098–
1101 (1972) (making a similar point about the distributional impacts of allocating 
entitlements). 
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to the well-off. It actually exacerbates existing inequalities and 
leads to lower total utility than a “neutral” distribution (like the 
even split of cleanliness, especially with tradability). So for this 
policy, government cost-benefit analyses that follow the efficiency 
criterion, and that are not offset by changes through taxes, will 
systematically choose policies that increase the utility of the rich 
more than the utility of the poor. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation that helps ex-
plain what drives these results. Figure 1A shows the relationship 
between an individual’s utility and income—a curve that flattens 
out as one’s income increases. This pollution example involves 
two types of individuals with different levels of income, each of 
whom receives the same utility gains from an improvement in en-
vironmental quality. But even if the two types of people have the 
same utility gains, quite different amounts in dollars are needed 
to achieve these same utility gains. The y-axis shows equal utility 
gains for the rich and the poor groups. With connecting dashed 
lines, the figure then shows on the x-axis the dollar gains that 
would achieve those utility gains for each group. Because of the 
declining marginal utility of income (represented by the curved 
line), the amount of income it would take the rich to achieve the 
same utility gain is much larger. Dollars are “cheap” to the rich 
because they already have so many of them; thus, the rich need 
to receive a lot of dollars for a given utility gain. And this is pre-
cisely what drives the results in the example: the rich have a 
higher willingness to pay in dollar terms for the pollution reduc-
tion because dollars are cheap to them. As a result, efficiency 
analysis allocates the pollution reduction to the rich because, as 
Figure 1B shows, the willingness to pay for an allocation of goods 
goes up with income. The Appendix produces parallel figures for 
the neutral and poor-biased cases. 
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FIGURE 1:  RELATIONSHIPS FOR RICH-BIASED POLICY 
FIGURE 1A:  UTILITY VERSUS INCOME 
 
FIGURE 1B:  WTP VERSUS INCOME 
 
Again, nothing in this Article hinges on anything about util-
ity functions. All we need to know is that empirically the rich tend 
to be willing to spend more than the poor on goods, which is why 
they in fact spend more. It is intuitive why they spend more: they 
have more money to spend. It could also be the case that they 
have different preferences or are able to borrow more easily or for 
a host of other differences. But what matters for efficiency analy-
sis is the empirical difference in willingness to pay. Nevertheless, 
Poor: willingness  
to pay 
Rich: willingness  
to pay 
Clean air  
to the rich 
Clean air  
to the poor 
Utility gains 
from goods 
allocation 
Income 
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to pay for a 
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understanding the phenomenon in utility terms may ease inter-
pretation of the prevalence and severity of the “rich get richer” 
principle. 
IV.  EXAMPLES OF EFFICIENT RICH-BIASED POLICIES IN PRACTICE 
To be influential, efficiency analysis need not explicitly be the 
decision-making rule that leads to a given policy outcome. Never-
theless, to help further concretize the ideas in this Article, this 
Part sketches a couple of the circumstances in which efficiency 
analysis is used explicitly in the law—particularly in rich-biased 
contexts because the business contexts in which neutral rules pre-
dominate are relatively straightforward. This Part first turns to 
federal regulatory cost-benefit analysis. It then describes how 
torts use efficiency analysis. 
A. Federal Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Arguably the most prominent use of efficiency analysis by 
government actors is that by federal government administrative 
agencies, as required by executive orders originally dating to the 
1980s and maintained by all presidents since then.110 According 
to federal guidance documents, federal regulatory analysis uses 
“benefit-cost analysis [to] provide[ ] decision makers with a clear 
indication of the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative 
that generates the largest net benefits to society.”111 The potential 
for perverse distributive impacts is most stark when the analysis 
directly treats rich and poor people differently.112 For example, if 
the torts example used in Part III involving pollution affecting 
health outcomes were a federal regulatory proceeding, then the 
same distributional consequences would arise: a greater likeli-
hood of pollution (without compensation) in poor neighborhoods 
than in rich ones. Sometimes, agencies use population averages 
of willingness to pay instead of disaggregating willingness to pay 
by the population affected so that rich and poor people are treated 
 
 110 The application of cost-benefit analysis to federal regulatory decisions began when 
President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 § 3(d) (1981), 3 CFR 127. 
President Bill Clinton’s administration adopted a similar approach when it issued 
Executive Order 12866, 3 CFR 638. Executive Order 12866 remained in place during the 
Bush and Obama administrations and has continued thus far into the Trump 
administration. 
 111 Circular A-4 at *2 (cited in note 3). 
 112 See note 161 (explaining how, though using different willingness to pay numbers 
for the rich and poor within a policy creates distributive disparities, even having the same 
number within a policy creates disparities across policies because of the greater resources 
going to policies that the rich prefer). 
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similarly.113 But sometimes they use different willingness to pay 
values for different income groups.114 And furthermore, Office of 
Management and Budget guidance suggests that agencies should 
use different values for different groups—for example, imple-
menting different policies in different geographies due to differ-
ential benefits, presumably including some differential willing-
ness to pay based on income.115 Moreover, at least one past top 
administrator of federal regulations (and prominent law profes-
sor), Cass Sunstein, has explicitly argued for using differential 
amounts of willingness to pay by income.116 This Section describes 
how transportation funding by federal agencies creates rich- 
biased rules. 
In particular, the procedure for allocating Department of 
Transportation (DOT) funds affects how much it spends on modes 
of transportation that tend to be used by rich versus poor people. 
For calculating the benefits of transportation improvements, a 
key ingredient is the value of time saved in transportation as a 
result of the improvement. The DOT publishes a yearly memo-
randum on the Value of Time Travel Savings (VTTS) that adopts 
a higher VTTS for air and high-speed rail travel than for other 
 
 113 See, for example, Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical 
Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses—2016 Adjustment *4–7 
(Department of Transportation, Aug 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/VG4A-9639 
(citing studies on the value of statistical life from different contexts and making no 
attempt to disaggregate); Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses: Mortality Risk 
Valuation Estimates (Appendix B) *B-4 (Environmental Protection Agency, Dec 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2ERB-6YBL (discussing age and health status as the two most 
important demographic variables that can influence WTP in EPA economic analyses); 
Revised Departmental Guidance: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and 
Injuries in Preparing Economic Analyses *8 (Federal Aviation Administration, Feb 2008), 
archived at http://perma.cc/D4AU-WC2M (“The same standard [for evaluating deaths and 
injuries] is to be applied to all individuals at risk, regardless of age, location, income, or 
mode of travel.”). 
 114 See notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Circular A-4 at *8 (cited in note 3) (“Where there are significant regional var-
iations in benefits and/or costs, you should consider the possibility of setting different re-
quirements for the different regions.”). But see id at *13 (“[A]nalysts should prefer use of 
population averages rather than information derived from subgroups dominated by a par-
ticular demographic or income group.”). 
 116 Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 Duke L J 385, 385 
(2004) (“Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a statisti-
cal life (VSL). This is a serious mistake. . . . [G]overnment should use a higher VSL for 
programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy—and a lower VSL for programs that 
disproportionately benefit the poor.”). But Sunstein also qualifies his argument, adding 
the caveat that a “uniform VSL, one that gives disadvantaged people regulatory protection 
in excess of their WTP, might turn out to have fortunate distributional consequences in 
the harder cases.” Id at 438. 
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surface modes of transportation for intercity travel, explicitly be-
cause the users of air and high-speed rail are richer than those of 
other surface modes of transportation.117 The memo explains that, 
“Since these modes charge higher fares to travelers who place a 
greater value on time saving, it is reasonable to derive a distinct 
VTTS from the higher incomes of their passengers.”118 DOT guid-
ance adds that “[t]he value of travel time is a critical factor in 
evaluating the benefits of transportation infrastructure invest-
ment and rulemaking initiatives,” including competitive grant 
programs for infrastructure investment.119 
This guidance affects the allocation of funds between trans-
portation that rich people versus poor people tend to use. For ex-
ample, every application for one of those competitive grant pro-
grams, the Transportation Investment Generating Economic 
Recovery (TIGER) program, must include a cost-benefit analy-
sis.120 DOT guidance on preparing these applications instructs ap-
plicants to use the DOT’s VTTS.121 Thus, in funding TIGER 
grants,122 DOT relies on a higher VTTS number for airport pro-
jects (which are more likely to be used by the rich) than for bus 
projects (which are more likely to be used by the poor).123 
As a result, because the monetary benefits of saving an hour 
of time for a rich person tend to be higher than the monetary ben-
efits of saving an hour of time for a poor person, spending on 
transportation will be rich-biased, resulting in a bias in favor of 
 
 117 See The Value of Travel Time Savings at *7 (cited in note 87). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Revised Departmental Guidance on Valuation of Travel Time in Economic Analysis 
*2 (Department of Transportation, Sept 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
2F7Z-5MWL (noting that these VTTS figures apply to the Transportation Investment 
Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant program and the High-Speed Intercity 
Passenger Rail Program). 
 120 See Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance for TIGER and INFRA Applications *5 
(Department of Transportation, July 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/PRH9-FGU4 
(stating that BCA is required in TIGER grant applications). 
 121 Id at *12. See also TIGER Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) Resource Guide *5 
(Department of Transportation, Mar 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2LK7-3XSJ 
(listing the DOT’s VTTS for use in BCA for TIGER applications); TIGER Benefit-Cost 
Analysis (BCA) Examples Appendix D n 1 (Department of Transportation, Mar 6, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9YSQ-L6Q2 (using the VTTS in an example of a strong TIGER 
application BCA published by the DOT). 
 122 See, for example, TIGER 2014 Awards *73 (Department of Transportation, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/WB36-SEJ9 (describing the Poplar Airport Redevelopment 
and Regional Access Project as a winner of a 2014 TIGER Grant). 
 123 Another example comes from the California High-Speed Rail Business Plan, pub-
lished in 2014. 2014 California High-Speed Rail Benefit-Cost Analysis *6 (California High-
Speed Rail Authority, Apr 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/49AS-7W8U (using the VTTS 
for high-speed rail from the DOT). 
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more spending for the rich than for the poor for a given reduction 
in travel time.124 Thus, federal transportation spending has a 
built-in procedure that will tend to transfer more of a legal enti-
tlement (transportation spending) to the rich, helping shorten 
their commutes, disproportionately easing their leisure travel, 
and disproportionately making them more productive.125 
B. Torts 
The primary example earlier in this Article concerned a tort 
against a polluter; it described the efficient duty of care required 
to establish the negligence standard, the threshold that, if ex-
ceeded, leads the polluter to pay damages.126 The Hand formula, 
which drove the determination of the negligence standard, is re-
flected in tort law. Indeed, the recent Restatement (Third) of 
Torts moved in the direction of focusing on the type of efficiency-
oriented cost-benefit analysis described here,127 attracting some 
criticism for ignoring equity.128 The Restatement explicitly says 
that its “test can also be called a ‘cost-benefit test,’ in which ‘cost’ 
 
 124 Of course, if there were no subsidy associated with federal transportation spending 
such that the government were paid back for its investments in transportation via fares, 
then there would be no issue (indeed, the spending would be similar to that by the private 
sector). However, that spending does in fact constitute a subsidy; the federal government 
is rarely, if ever, paid back for its spending on transportation. See, for example, Federal 
Subsidies to Passenger Transportation *5–10 (Department of Transportation, Dec 2004), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8KGY-NMF3 (describing federal subsidies for various modes 
of transportation); Robert Damuth, Federal Subsidies for Passenger Transportation, 1960–
2009: Focus on 2002–2009 *23–27 (Nathan Associates, Inc, Mar 2, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3K6N-RHHX (same). 
 125 For another example, see the similar efficient, rich-biased procedure used by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS has recently published a value 
of time report that set the value of time for “[e]mployees undertaking administrative and 
other tasks during paid work time” at “[p]re-tax wages + benefits + other indirect costs” 
and “[i]ndividuals undertaking administrative and other tasks on their own time” at 
“[p]ost-tax wages” for use in rulemaking agency-wide. Jennifer R. Baxter, Lisa A. 
Robinson, and James K. Hammit, Valuing Time in U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Regulatory Impact Analyses: Conceptual Framework and Best Practices *13 
(Department of Health and Human Services, June 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z635-H9BJ. Consider a mandate that takes an hour of a worker’s time. 
The cost-benefit threshold is more likely to be passed if the mandate applies to poor 
workers than to rich workers because the poor workers’ time is worth less (assuming that 
the benefits are the same for higher-paid and lower-paid workers). This policy then 
functions as a higher tax on the time of lower-paid workers than of higher-paid workers. 
 126 See Part III.F. 
 127 See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3(h) (2010). 
 128 See, for example, Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as well as Efficiency Values, 54 Vand 
L Rev 901, 925–26 (2001) (encouraging the Restatement (Third)’s drafters to use language 
that acknowledges a role for “social judgments about policy and principle” in court 
decisions). 
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signifies the cost of precautions and the ‘benefit’ is the reduction 
in risk those precautions would achieve.”129 In estimating those 
costs and benefits, scholars see the Restatement as using the kind 
of efficiency analysis described in this Article.130 Of course, typi-
cally juries decide whether a duty of care has been met—and the 
extent to which juries are given instructions conforming with the 
Restatement is unclear (some suspect that it is infrequent131), but 
the efficiency-oriented Hand formula, with the distributional con-
sequences described earlier, is clearly used at least sometimes.132 
Efficiency analysis is apparent in other aspects of torts as 
well, particularly economic damages. In particular, workers are 
typically eligible for compensation for lost wages resulting from 
tortious behavior.133 Higher-income workers have higher wages 
and, thus, de facto have a larger legal entitlement. For example, 
consider a dangerous driver driving in a rich neighborhood versus 
a poor neighborhood. Drivers responding to incentives would ex-
pect to pay more if they cause an injury in the rich neighborhood 
than in the poor neighborhood. They may thus drive more dan-
gerously in the poor neighborhood, increasing the likelihood of an 
accident there, thereby reducing the legal entitlement of poor 
groups to safe traffic conditions.134 But this is efficient: the rich 
are willing to pay more for not being injured than the poor are. 
The purpose of this Article is not to lay out the broad spec-
trum of policy when efficient rules are adopted in ways that could 
lead to rich-biased rules. That is an important project, but one for 
another day. The purpose of this Part is merely to illustrate the 
concept with real-world examples—and to begin alluding to when 
efficient rules may be viewed as problematic, the issue that the 
next Part takes up. 
 
 129 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3(e) (2010). 
 130 See, for example, Simons, 54 Vand L Rev at 906–16 (cited in note 128); James A. 
Henderson Jr, Richard N. Pearson, and Douglas A. Kysar, The Torts Process 172 (Wolters 
Kluwer 8th ed 2012) (making this claim). As support, the authors note that the 
Restatement says that “courts regularly consider private interests, both because society is 
the protector of private interests and because the general public good is promoted by the 
protection and advancement of private interests.” Id, citing Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§ 3(h) (2010). 
 131 See Henderson, Pearson, and Kysar, The Torts Process at 172 (cited in note 130), 
citing Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer 
Look at the Controversy, 41 Loyola LA L Rev 1171, 1183 (2008). 
 132 See, for example, Davis v Consolidated Rail Corp, 788 F2d 1260, 1263–64 (7th Cir 
1986); United States v Carroll Towing, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947). 
 133 See Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick, The Law of Torts § 479 (cited in note 80). 
 134 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 Yale L J 82, 86 (2011) (presenting 
the argument that legal standards of care ought to be different when driving in rich and 
poor neighborhoods before ultimately rejecting it). 
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V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Article is primarily descriptive, showing how different 
types of policies have different distributional implications. 
Nevertheless, this Part sketches potential policy implications of 
debiasing efficiency analysis, providing guidance on when and 
why to consider distributive consequences in economic 
policymaking and when to consider not adopting efficient policies 
if one has a goal of not redistributing toward the rich. 
This Part takes “fairness” as a normative goal of institutions 
like courts and administrative agencies—in particular, not 
systematically distributing more legal entitlements to the rich or 
to the poor without compensating transfers. One could view this 
goal as a key attribute of the legitimacy of these institutions,135 as 
a requirement of Rawlsian fairness,136 as a libertarian goal of the 
government not picking and choosing policy winners, 137 or as a 
component of “folk justice.”138 Alternatively, one could view this 
kind of fairness as an instrumental feature of welfare; for 
example, as Part III.F shows, if both the rich and the poor suffer 
more in welfare terms as pollution increases, then it is welfare-
enhancing to spread out the pollution between the rich and the 
poor rather than focus the pollution on the poor.139 However, 
because of the broad normative disagreement about the role of 
social welfare and redistribution in different ethical theories, this 
Article focuses on fairness, so defined. For example, some believe 
that, if welfare is the goal, federal agencies should redistribute 
 
 135 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 95–98 (Harvard 1984) (dis-
cussing the link between equal treatment and government legitimacy); Max Weber, Poli-
tics as Vocation, in Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, trans and ed, Weber’s Rationalism 
and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification 
133, 137–38 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) (discussing the legal-rational justification for au-
thority, with its legitimation requiring a general belief in the correctness of the rules). 
 136 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 86 (Belknap 1999) (arguing that “undeserved 
inequalities call for redress”). 
 137 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 33 (Basic 1974) (arguing that gov-
ernment must be “neutral between its citizens”). 
 138 See Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Fairness and Folk Justice 5 (Cambridge 2013) 
(“[J]udgments of fairness are often based on the relationship between efforts and expend-
itures on the one hand and rewards and outcomes on the other.”). See also id at 3 (“Folk 
justice may include distributional concerns, but also includes procedural concerns.”). 
 139 This definition of fairness thus need not conflict with the goal of well-being. See 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 5–6 (Harvard 2002) (defining 
“fairness” as a goal other than that of well-being and arguing against the use of such a 
goal as potentially inconsistent with the Pareto criterion of adopting policies that make 
everyone better off when available). The analysis here is, by design, consistent with the 
Pareto criterion because—when taxes and transfers are available to compensate losers for 
policies that grow the size of the pie—this Article recommends adopting those policies even 
when allocations are different to the rich and the poor. 
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toward the poor.140 On the other hand, while many may not want 
courts or administrative agencies distributing more legal 
entitlements to the rich than the poor because of efficiency 
analysis, they also may not want them redistributing to the poor 
either. 
As a result, this Article adopts a fairly minimalist standard 
of fairness between the rich and poor in distributing legal entitle-
ments while still taking advantage of opportunities that make all 
groups better off. To those unconcerned about the government 
distributing more legal entitlements to the rich than to the poor 
without the rich paying for them, the Article’s descriptive contri-
bution stands even without these normative implications. But 
these implications are essential to those who hold any of the broad 
range of normative commitments suggesting that systematically 
distributing more to the rich is problematic. 
One possible response to this Article’s analysis is to ignore 
efficiency altogether given its bias against the poor. That ap-
proach seems unwise. Efficiency creates economic surplus— 
growing the size of the economic pie—that, in principle, can be 
redistributed to make everyone better off. For example, the gov-
ernment could invest more in airports (largely benefitting the 
rich) and less in buses (largely benefitting the poor), and then in-
crease transfers to the poor. Doing so could be efficient because of 
the rich’s relatively high willingness to pay for airport improve-
ments. Furthermore, in neutral cases, in which the distributional 
impacts may even out, ignoring efficiency could mean ignoring 
opportunities to make everyone better off. 
Rather, this Article suggests a different approach: taking 
guidance from legal context. This Article’s analysis suggests a 
two-part inquiry for efficient policies, as laid out in the flow chart 
in Figure 2. If two conditions hold and one does not want to dis-
tribute more to the rich than to the poor—while still taking op-
portunities to make all groups better off—then efficient legal 
rules should be modified to be inefficient and make equal alloca-
tions to the rich and poor. That is, if one has a goal of not redis-
tributing toward the rich in judicial, administrative, or even leg-
islative rulemaking, the results imply that different policies 
should be adopted depending on the legal context. The analysis, 
of course, applies only to efficient rules. Lots of adopted policies 
 
 140 See Matthew D. Adler, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Over-
view, 10 Rev Envir Econ & Pol 264, 269–73 (2016). 
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are not efficient, with a variety of distributional consequences, 
but they are not implicated by the analysis here. 
FIGURE 2:  WHEN EFFICIENT POLICIES SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO 
TREAT RICH AND POOR ALIKE 
 
The approach begins with a threshold bifurcation: Is the con-
text one that is likely to lead to a rich-biased rule? If so, then the 
distributional concerns that this Article describes will arise. For 
neutral policies like those resulting from changing business prof-
itability, policymakers could hold different views on the necessity 
of compensating losers on a policy-by-policy basis, but there is a 
supportable argument that policy impacts could even out over a 
large number of policies: there is no inherent bias. Any given pol-
icy may benefit the rich or the poor. But the rich and poor “count” 
equally because each has the same willingness to pay for $1. So 
efficient neutral policies may tend to make all income groups 
richer. 
For rich-biased policies, in contrast, the notion that distribu-
tional impacts will even out is not plausible. Rather, there is an 
inherent legal entitlement bias. If one holds the view that policy 
should not distribute more legal entitlements to the rich than to 
Keep efficient 
policies 
Adopt inefficient  
policies that treat 
rich and poor alike 
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policy context 
2. Are distributional 
consequences sticky 
or are they offset? 
Rich-biased Neutral 
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the poor without making the rich pay, then this result should 
cause concern. Even rich-biased policies with small distributional 
stakes risk perverse impacts: lots of small biased policies can add 
up to a lot of bias in aggregate.141 These distributional impacts 
justify inefficient policies that treat rich and poor alike if another 
condition holds.142 
Second, are the policy’s distributional consequences likely to 
be offset or sticky? Or something in between? As Part I describes, 
inertia and interest groups could contribute to a lack of offset. The 
lower the probability of distributional offset, the greater the risk 
of perverse distributional consequences. While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to delve into this issue, several factors could 
contribute to the likelihood of offset.143 
First, the institution adopting the policy can matter. In gen-
eral, legislatures, with their taxing power and greater perceived 
democratic legitimacy, can more easily adjust policies to address 
distributional concerns. In contrast, administrative agencies and 
courts are less able to offset distributional consequences, making 
it more likely that perverse distributional consequences will stick. 
 
 141 Note, however, that distributional impacts can be more complicated than initially 
meets the eye; for example, if the two parties involved in a policy are in a contractual 
relationship, then distributional impacts that at first seem significant may ultimately 
prove illusory—if, for example, a legal rule that appears to benefit the poor instead results 
in higher prices for the poor. In this case, the government is not actually distributing 
something between the rich and the poor, and there is no rich-biased rule. 
 142 It might seem like there should next be a step distinguishing rich-biased policies 
in which the government can differentially allocate to the rich and the poor from those in 
which it cannot. For example, in the tort and transportation cost-benefit examples, the 
rich and poor can be treated differently: there’s a different legal standard for rich and poor 
homeowners in the tort example, and a different value of time for services that the rich 
and poor use in the transportation example. By contrast, the government (roughly speak-
ing) provides national defense, public television, and public health research to everyone. 
Do rich-biased policies’ distributional impacts then become unproblematic? No. Even when 
there are not differential allocations within a policy, there can still be bias across policies. 
 The reason this bias can exist is that, across policies, the efficient policies devote more 
resources to the things that the rich prefer and less to the things that the poor prefer. 
Consider public health research into cures to diseases that are given out freely to everyone. 
Because the rich are more likely to reach old age, when a cure for Alzheimer’s is valuable, 
all else equal, the level of efficient spending on a cure for Alzheimer’s will be higher than 
the efficient level for a cure for malaria because poorer people tend to contract malaria. 
Similarly, the rich likely have much more wealth protected by national defense than 
poorer people do, so it is efficient to spend more on that than priorities for the poor. Thus, 
the distributional concern is greater when there is differentiation between rich and poor 
within a policy, but the concern does not go away when there is no such differentiation. 
 143 See Liscow, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud at 18–29 (cited in note 19) (describing how 
the distributional consequences of school funding decisions are generally not offset); 
Fennell and McAdams, 100 Minn L Rev at 1079–1109 (cited in note 19) (suggesting that 
political failures can prevent the offset of perverse distributional consequences of efficient 
legal rules). 
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Of course, other institutions may act to offset those distributional 
consequences; for example, an administrative agency may enact 
a rich-biased rule with substantial distributional consequences, 
and the legislature can offset those consequences. But the fact 
that it would be difficult for the administrative agency itself to 
offset them probably makes it less likely that they will be offset 
than in the case of a legislature. 
Second, the salience of the change may matter. Large, salient 
changes may be more likely to attract attention and be offset, 
while small changes that fly under the radar may be less likely to 
attract attention. For example, the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act144 was a large and salient form of redistribu-
tion—and also helped generate a backlash that put Republicans 
in power.145 
Third, offsets that comply with voters’ moral intuitions may 
be more likely to be achieved. For example, recent empirical evi-
dence suggests that many individuals do not view taxes primarily 
as a means of redistribution.146 As a result, offsets that would re-
quire large transfers through the tax code may be politically dif-
ficult to achieve. On the other hand, offsets that can be accom-
plished by, say, directly compensating the losers of government 
policy or through expanded social insurance may be more palata-
ble and thus more likely to happen.147 
Fourth, when the government has the tools to offset distribu-
tional consequences, offset is presumably more likely. For exam-
ple, suppose that a state court enacts a change with distributional 
consequences. States that have progressive income taxes that im-
pose different rates on the rich and the poor may be more likely 
to be able to offset those consequences because they have a good 
tool to do so. Specifically, they could change the progressivity of 
 
 144 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119, codified in various sections of Title 42. 
 145 Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No’ (Politico, Dec 4, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7RVM-BRA2. 
 146 See, for example, Matthew Weinzierl, The Promise of Positive Optimal Taxation: 
Normative Diversity and a Role for Equal Sacrifice, 118 J Pub Econ 128, 131–32 (2014) 
(showing with survey evidence that many people do not view taxes with the utilitarian 
goal of redistribution to lower-income households). 
 147 See, for example, Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? 
Law, Social Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 Tax L Rev 313, 352–58 (2011) 
(reviewing evidence showing greater political support for universalist social insurance pro-
grams over programs that are less universalist in their framing). 
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their state income taxes compared to states that have a flat state 
income tax rate and thus do not have such a tool.148  
Finally, as Part I discusses, groups that are better able to or-
ganize may be more likely to achieve their distributional objec-
tives, as described by the public choice school of economics.149 
Thus, when the relative losers from a policy change are disbursed, 
politically weak, and unorganized, offset may be less likely. 
In any case, an individualized determination based on the 
actual legal context—including the institution and policy 
involved—is required here. For example, a rich-biased efficient 
policy on transportation spending adopted by federal regulation 
in the Obama Administration was presumably more likely to be 
offset through congressional action in 2009–2010, when 
Democrats relatively supportive of redistribution to the poor 
controlled Congress, than in 2011–2016, when Republicans 
controlled the House of Representatives.150 Of course, offset need 
not be immediate—but as noted earlier, the distributional 
consequences in the short and medium run may matter more than 
those in the long run.151 
If policies reach the bottom right of the flow chart—that is, if 
they are (1) efficient, rich-biased policies with (2) a low probability 
of offset—then they deserve different treatment. With this set of 
policies, for those with a broad set of normative commitments, 
this Article offers an important reason to consider adopting less 
efficient legal rules that are less biased against the poor and that 
instead treat the rich and the poor the same way. 
Concretely, under this reasoning, after Republicans opposed 
to more transfers to the poor took control of the House of 
Representatives in 2011, the Obama Administration should have 
issued guidance that had the same value of time figure for the 
rich and the poor when calculating the value of transportation 
improvements. Instead, in the face of persistently high income 
inequality that it professed to find problematic152 and little 
 
 148 See Liscow, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud at 35 (cited in note 19) (“The absence of a 
tax tool to use would be part of the political economy mechanism by which there is no 
offset.”). 
 149 See notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Chris Canipe, Republicans Take Control (Wall St J, Jan 21, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/H3SG-MB4T (showing when different parties controlled Congress). 
 151 See note 66 and accompanying text. 
 152 Barack H. Obama, Remarks at Osawatomie High School in Osawatomie, Kansas, 
2011 Pub Papers 1515, 1519. 
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prospect of increased transfers to the poor,153 the Administration 
used guidance that contained a systematic bias toward 
transportation improvements benefitting the rich over those 
benefitting the poor. 
Taking other examples discussed earlier in this Article, this 
framework could also mean: 
• Following the same liability standard for polluting on poor 
and rich individuals; 
• Spending the same amount on research and development 
for a given reduction in diseases that affect rich and poor 
people; 
• Spending the same amount for a given improvement in 
road safety, the ease of voting, or speed of commuting for 
the rich and the poor; 
• Spending the same amount for a given reduction in crime 
for the rich and the poor; 
• Building similar parks in rich and poor neighborhoods. 
These steps treat the rich and the poor in similar ways across 
various rich-biased policy areas. For example, as Professors 
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have described, administrative 
rulemakers could adjust parties’ measured willingness to pay to 
remove the effect of income, thus “launder[ing]” parties’ 
preferences.154 How to do so will again depend on legal context, 
and it is beyond the scope of this Article to work out how to do so 
in any given circumstance. But it is fair to say, given the 
centrality of efficiency to policymaking and the frequency and 
severity of the bias, that the consequences would be profound. 
Finally, to be clear, for policies that do not satisfy both con-
ditions, this Article does not claim that there should be no mod-
ification from the efficient policy. For example, to correct per-
ceived inequalities in existing policy, a committed 
redistributionist may want to modify efficient neutral rules, es-
pecially those that distribute more to the rich than to the poor, 
 
 153 Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No’ (cited in note 145) (describing Republican opposition 
to the Democratic Party’s agenda during President Obama’s tenure). 
 154 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 130–31, 142–46, 152 (Harvard 2006) (discussing adjustments to willingness to 
pay to compensate for parties’ different incomes and potential objections to such an 
approach). See also Adler, 10 Rev Envir Econ & Pol at 269–73 (cited in note 140) (same). 
What the “distributional weights” should be is a difficult question for policymakers to 
answer. 
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to promote a more egalitarian distribution of income.155 Nor is 
there necessarily any moral difference between two rules—one 
neutral and the other rich-biased—with the same distributional 
consequences. Others should explore this. There is, however, a 
difference in whether there is a systematic bias in how efficient 
rules will allocate entitlements. And this Article has adopted a 
weaker standard with wide acceptance across those with many 
political commitments: that the government should not system-
atically distribute more to the rich than to the poor solely be-
cause of the rich’s greater wealth without compensating policies 
for the poor. 
VI.  RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITIQUES 
A. Considering Economic Growth 
One potential criticism of the analysis is that it seems 
static—that is, it considers efficiency only at a point in time 
rather than considering impacts on economic growth.156 The 
concern here is that the pursuit of efficiency, even if it increases 
inequality, also spurs growth by increasing, for example, the 
accumulation of capital and innovation, ultimately leading to 
higher income for everyone. In its analysis, this Article engages 
in the standard practice of not considering growth effects, and the 
goal in this Article is not to question that standard practice. 
Nevertheless, this Section touches on a few reasons that this 
Article’s analysis stands even when considering growth. 
The first is the most important and the most basic: with a 
simple redefinition of the question, the same underlying logic ap-
plies and the same broad conclusions are true—efficient policies 
tend to be rich-biased. Instead of thinking about the policy ques-
tion as pertaining to one point in time, think about policies across, 
say, a hundred-year period, including economic growth over that 
period. An efficient rich-biased policy that creates a given amount 
of surplus over a hundred-year period will still allocate a larger 
amount of the legal entitlement to the rich than to the poor be-
cause the rich at any point in time are willing to pay more. 
 
 155 Furthermore, the notion that neutral rules have distributional impacts that “even 
out” because there is no systematic bias is an empirical question; it is a plausible view to 
hold, but overall distributional impacts could go either way. 
 156 See, for example, Robert D. Cooter and Aaron Edlin, Law and Growth Economics: 
A Framework for Research *3–4 (Berkeley Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 
Series, Jan 13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Y3UW-LKR2. 
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There are two other responses as well. First, even ignoring 
such a redefinition, to benefit the poor, the benefits have to reach 
the poor—and as much recent research has shown, for the most 
part, that has not happened in decades through either rising 
wages or changing economic policies.157 Second, growing evidence 
suggests that inequality itself reduces economic growth, 
potentially making everyone worse off, as a recent International 
Monetary Fund report argued, for example.158 
More broadly, the division between neutral and rich-biased 
policies developed in this Article raises questions about the extent 
to which a pursuit of efficiency really promotes growth. Neutral 
rules maximize dollars. As a result, the efficient rule produces an 
economy with more investable capital for use on new machines 
and innovations, increasing growth.159 In the torts example above, 
as a result of the efficient liability rule, the economy becomes 
$5,000 more productive. (That is, the economy is able to produce 
the same goods and services at a cost $5,000 less than without the 
efficient rule because the rule induces the factory to install the 
scrubbers at a cost of $5,000 instead of making the laundromat 
install the air purifier for $10,000.) Thus, businesses have $5,000 
more to spend on growth-inducing investments. To those who 
think that dynamic growth is very important to lifting all boats 
in the long run and that capital accumulating aids in growth, this 
neutral legal rule achieves that goal. 
However, the results are quite different for the rich-biased 
rule. Rich-biased rules maximize willingness to pay units, not dol-
lars. In a rich-biased rule like that in the torts example, there is 
no increase in investable capital or other increase in innovation 
when allocating the clean air to the rich homeowners but not the 
poor homeowners. The factory’s profits decrease if it purchases 
the scrubbers, thereby reducing its investable capital, but there 
is no difference between the cases of the rich and poor homeown-
ers because the homeowners themselves are just accumulating 
WTPs and not dollars through the efficient legal rule. Thus, in 
 
 157 Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National 
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q J Econ 553, 581 (2018) 
(showing decades of “stagnation of income in the bottom 50%” of individuals in the US 
economy). 
 158 Era Dabla-Norris, et al, Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global 
Perspective *6–9 (International Monetary Fund, June 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9UQB-SEXR. 
 159 See Robert E. Lucas Jr, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J 
Monetary Econ 3, 39–41 (1988) (finding that a model with capital accumulation is a good 
explanation for economic growth, along with other factors). 
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allocating clean air to the rich homeowners but not the poor home-
owners, the economy is richer in WTPs, but there is no increase 
in investable capital that could have dynamic growth effects, fur-
ther undercutting the value of rich-biased rules to those who focus 
on the growth-inducing effects of focusing on efficient legal rules. 
B. Adding Complexity to Policymaking 
One may argue that this analysis misses a host of potential 
complicating factors. For example, returning to the rich-biased 
case of the homeowner and the factory, consider how the factory’s 
decision to pollute might affect gentrification, such as whether 
new people migrate into the neighborhood, crime goes up or down, 
or a host of other factors. Those are good points, and any full 
analysis would want to consider them. But that’s not a criticism 
of anything that this Article suggests; rather, it is a criticism of 
efficiency analysis itself. If those factors are easily incorporated 
into WTP calculations, then they presumably will be. If not, then 
they may not be—but the point does not blunt the force of this 
Article’s critique. 
But another set of concerns this Article raises does add com-
plexity to the analysis. In particular, the policy response section 
suggests that analysis and policymaking should take into account 
contextual factors, including the likelihood of distributional off-
set. Allowing the possibility of different political responses into 
the analysis would add complexity, versus merely assuming— 
regardless of context—that all distributional consequences are 
offset. Readers will need to decide for themselves between the 
merits of the possibilities: (1) adopting possibly wrong assump-
tions in the name of simplicity—with the potential distributional 
consequences this Article describes—versus (2) adopting more 
flexible assumptions about politics that may be more realistic, 
adding complexity but also reducing the risk of perverse distribu-
tional consequences. 
CONCLUSION:  LAW AND ECONOMICS IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 
When then-Professor Richard Posner published the 
efficiency-oriented Economic Analysis of the Law in 1972, law and 
economics scholar Professor A. Mitchell Polinsky called the book 
a “potentially defective product” in that “even a valuable product 
is subject to misuse if proper instructions are not included.”160 In 
 
 160 A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A 
Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv L Rev 1655, 1681 (1974). 
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particular, the distributive consequences of policies had to be 
considered.161 Despite Polinsky’s warning, economic analysis of 
the law has long been guided by the assumption that the 
distributive consequences of policies do not matter because taxes 
should respond to take care of distributive considerations. But 
there is little evidence that taxes in fact do respond. This Article 
draws out the distributive implications of adopting efficient 
policies when other policies do not offset those distributional 
consequences. 
This Article shows that, under many circumstances, efficient 
policies are not merely neutral with respect to the distribution of 
income. Rather, efficient policies systematically tend to distribute 
legal entitlements to the rich, exacerbating inequality. Especially 
given the widespread concern over rising income inequality, it is 
time to consider adopting policies that reduce efficiency but have 
fairer distributional outcomes, at least in some circumstances. 
The necessary analysis may be more difficult, but—lacking evi-
dence that the perverse consequences of efficient rich-biased pol-
icies are offset—such policies are worth pursuing in the appropri-
ate contexts. 
How policymakers should respond is a longer-term project. 
One can imagine two extremes: (1) always adopting efficient 
policies and (2) ignoring efficiency altogether. Both have 
unappealing features. Without offsetting policies, always 
adopting efficient policies will have a systematic bias against the 
poor. On the other hand, ignoring efficiency altogether means 
missing out on opportunities to make all groups better off. 
Efficient neutral policies have distributional impacts that may 
even out and make everyone better off. And if there are some 
taxes and transfers, then considering willingness to pay driven by 
income allows the combination of efficient policies with taxes and 
transfers to make everyone better off. 
Rather, if policymakers consider distributional consequences 
with a goal of being fairer, this Article suggests the importance of 
considering context in deciding whether to deviate from the 
efficient rule. First, is the legal context one of neutrality or rich 
bias? Because neutral policies have distributional consequences 
that may even out in the long term while rich-biased policies do 
not, the case for deviating from the efficient rule is stronger for 
rich-biased policies. And second, are the distributional 
consequences likely to be offset or be sticky? This second question 
 
 161 Id at 1679 (“[T]he distributional consequences of the law should not be ignored.”). 
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is one of political economy, a topic that is typically absent in 
economic analysis in lieu of an implicit political economy 
assumption that the consequences are offset. For efficient, rich-
biased rules with distributional consequences that are sticky, a 
broad range of political commitments suggest that policymakers 
should adopt explicitly inefficient rules that treat the rich and the 
poor alike. 
These contextual elements powerfully motivate avenues of 
future scholarly research. A first implication is empirical in na-
ture: When is distributional offset likely to happen and when is it 
not? The more promising the prospects for offset, the more tradi-
tional efficiency analysis is appropriate. More broadly, a second 
empirical task is determining which policies can benefit the poor 
the most while causing the least loss in efficiency. 
Likewise, the results raise the urgency of actually imple-
menting offsetting taxes and transfers, which can make everyone 
better off in concert with efficient policies. Failing increased off-
set, though, the results suggest a greater scope for law and eco-
nomics analysis that trades off equity and efficiency to comple-
ment existing efficiency-minded law and economics analysis, and 
for more policy that puts the rich and poor on equal footing rather 
than making the rich richer. 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix first presents the technical definition of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in Section A. Section B then presents the 
technical definition of “legal entitlement neutrality.” Section C 
presents the result that a simple formula can be used to 
determine if a given utility function produces rich-biased, neutral, 
or poor-biased legal rules. It then explains the intuition for the 
result. Section D maps this Article’s categorization onto the 
conventional economics definitions of “normal” and “inferior” 
goods. Section E shows utility functions that correspond to each 
type of policy and explains them graphically. Section F shows the 
math behind Part III.F’s example of tradable pollution permits. 
A. Technical Definition of Efficiency 
The following notation defines K-H efficiency. There are 𝐼 
individuals indexed by 𝑖. Suppose that there is some thing 𝑥	that 
the government is allocating through public policy to individuals 
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such that individual 𝑖 receives quantity 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 with 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑋.162  
K-H efficiency asks which of these allocations creates the greatest 
amount of aggregate social surplus, denoted for each individual 
by 𝑠𝑖 𝑥𝑖 . K-H efficiency adds up the surplus for each individual 
and chooses the set of allocations with the highest sum; that is, it 
chooses the policy that satisfies max
𝑥?,.	.	.,𝑥𝐼 𝑠𝑖(𝑥𝑖)𝑖 . 
Surplus measures how much a policy increases the expendi-
ture function, denoted 	𝑒𝑖 𝑣 , which measures the smallest 
amount that an individual needs to spend to achieve utility level 
𝑣. In other words, the expenditure function, and thus surplus, is 
a measure of how much people are willing to pay for a policy 
change. More precisely, surplus compares the expenditure func-
tion evaluated at the utility under the alternative policy 𝑣𝑖A (with 
given allocation 𝑥𝑖) with the expenditure function evaluated at the 
status quo utility level 𝑣𝑖B, or 𝑠𝑖 = 	𝑒𝑖 𝑣𝑖A -	𝑒𝑖 𝑣𝑖B . For example, sup-
pose that: (1) under the status quo policy, an individual achieves 
a utility level of 13 and spends $100 to achieve; (2) she would 
achieve a utility level of 15 with a new government policy alloca-
tion 𝑥𝑖; and (3) it would take $150 of spending to achieve a utility 
level of 15 under the status quo policy. Then 	𝑒𝑖 13 = $100, 	𝑒𝑖 15 = 	$150, and 𝑠𝑖 𝑥𝑖 = $50.	Surplus thus measures how the 
expenditure function changes under different possible policies. It 
measures the amount that individual 𝑖 would have to pay or be 
paid to make her indifferent between the status quo and the al-
ternative policy. In this example, the individual would be willing 
to pay $50 to shift to the new policy. This amount is unique to 
each individual, as determined by her utility function and income. 
B. Legal Entitlement Neutrality 
Legal entitlement neutrality means that: 
𝜕F𝑠 𝑢 𝑥, 𝑐
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 0 
where (as described above) 𝑠 is surplus, 𝑥 is some policy variable 
(conceptualized here as an entirely government-provided good or 
service), and 𝑐 is one’s consumption or income (which are equiva-
lent and thus interchangeable in this one-period model because 
 
 162 This explanation roughly follows the notation of Nathaniel Hendren, Efficient 
Welfare Weights *5 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 20351, Oct 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/99J6-45ZK. For one commonly used exposition, see 
Angus Deaton and John Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior 217–22 
(Cambridge 1980). 
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people consume all their income) such that utility 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢 𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 . 
The interpretation of the condition is that, as income 𝑐 changes, 
the extent to which an increase in policy variable 𝑥 increases sur-
plus 𝑠 𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑥
 does not change. That is the condition for not changing 
the allocation of legal entitlements as people get richer because 
increased surplus is what drives larger allocations in efficiency 
analysis. Note a couple of restrictions with this setup: there are 
only two goods, and transaction costs are not explicitly modeled. 
If providing good or service 𝑥 provides more surplus 𝑠 as one’s 
income 𝑐 increases, then it is a rich-biased policy: because the rich 
are willing to pay more for it, efficiency-oriented analysis will en-
dow well-off individuals with more of it than poor individuals. For 
rich-biased policies, 𝜕
G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
> 0. 
In contrast, if the poor are willing to pay more for the good, 
so that surplus for the provision of 𝑥 increases as income de-
creases, then the good is poor-biased. For poor-biased policies, 
𝜕G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
< 0. 
In between are neutral goods, for which income does not im-
pact the surplus from provision of the good. That is, 𝜕
G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 0. 
C. Relation of Legal Entitlement Neutrality to Utility 
Functions: Main Results 
This Section of the Appendix defines legal entitlement neu-
trality in terms of utility functions. As noted earlier, the determi-
nation of legal entitlement neutrality is in principle measurable 
empirically without reference to utility functions. Nevertheless, 
understanding from a utility framework what drives whether a 
policy is legal entitlement neutral may be helpful for those who 
think in such terms. In particular, this setup yields the following 
result: 
Result 1: A policy is rich-biased if and only if: 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 > 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑐F ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 
A policy is neutral if OGPOQO7 = OGPO7G ∙ OP OQOP O7, and a policy is poor-
biased if OGPOQO7 < OGPO7G ∙ OP OQOP O7. 
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The proof is below; I focus here on intuition. The formula com-
pares two things: (1) how more consumption 𝑐	changes the mar-
ginal utility of good 𝑥 𝜕
G𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
 with (2) the slope of the marginal util-
ity of consumption 𝜕
G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G , or how more consumption changes the 
marginal utility of consumption, multiplied by the ratio of the 
marginal utility of good 𝑥 divided by the marginal utility of con-
sumption to normalize utility.163 We know that, under typical as-
sumptions, the first term 𝜕
G𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
 has an unclear sign, but the se-
cond set of terms 𝜕
G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐  is negative because 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑐G < 0 by the 
declining marginal utility of income and 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥 > 0 and 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 > 0 
by nonsatiation. 
Thus, the formula boils down to a simple comparison: 
whether, as an individual’s consumption increases, the marginal 
utility from policy 𝑥 decreases more rapidly than that of income 
(scaled by the ratio of marginal utility for policy 𝑥 and consump-
tion). If the marginal utility of policy 𝑥 decreases less rapidly than 
the utility of income, then the good is rich-biased—for example, if 
the utility of the good (say, clean air) stays constant with income 
𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 0  and there is a declining marginal utility of income 
𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G < 0 . If the inequality goes the other way, the good is poor-
biased. And if the two terms are equal, the good is neutral. In 
other words, goods that poor people really want—that they get so 
much utility from that they are willing to pay more for them than 
 
 163 The ratio 
OP OQOP O7 is a normalization. For example, consumption 𝑐 could be denomi-
nated in dollars or cents, and policy 𝑥 could similarly be denominated in big or small units. 
This ratio thus provides a normalization of the marginal utility of consumption such that, 
when multiplied by this ratio, it is in the same units as the cross-partial term OGPO7OQ. Sup-
pose, for example, that OGPO7G = −1 (an extra dollar in consumption reduces the marginal 
utility of consumption by one util). And suppose further that OGPO7OQ = −3 (an extra dollar in 
consumption reduces the marginal utility of 𝑥 by three utils) when good 𝑥 is in centigram 
units and OGPO7OQ = −0.3 when good 𝑥 is in milligram units. In the first case, the marginal 
utility of consumption is more negative than OGPO7OQ and, in the second, it is less negative. 
Thus, appropriately scaling the declining marginal utility of consumption is essential be-
cause—without the scaling—whether the good is rich-biased would depend upon the units 
for good 𝑥. (That scaling would be provided by supposing, for example, that 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥 = 4 when 𝑥 is in centigram units and 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥 = 0.4 when it is in milligram units.) 
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rich people, despite their greater poverty—are poor-biased. Oth-
erwise, goods are rich-biased or neutral. 
The intuition for the result is as follows: efficiency-based 
legal entitlement allocations are based on willingness to pay. 
Suppose for simplicity that the utility of something stays constant 
with income (for example, both rich and poor people may value 
clean air the same amount in utility terms)—in other words, the 
first term of the formula in Result 1 equals 0. Then the 
willingness to pay for something increases with income as long as 
the utility from yet an extra dollar of consumption goes down as 
income increases—in other words, as long as there is a declining 
marginal utility of consumption (that is, the second term in 
Result 1 is negative). But other times, one’s utility from having 
something does not stay constant with income and instead 
declines with income. In those cases, when the utility of having 
the thing declines rapidly enough, willingness to pay can stay 
constant or even decline with income. 
Overall, then, there are three factors inclining a good to be 
rich-biased, corresponding to the three terms in the formula in 
Result 1. First, as one would intuitively expect, when income has 
a more positive effect on the marginal utility of good 𝑥, good 𝑥 is 
more likely to be rich-biased. Second, when the marginal utility 
of consumption is diminishing very rapidly (that is, it is strongly 
negative), the policy is more likely to be rich-biased because it will 
take a large money transfer to make up for the utility gains from 
the policy. Third, when there is a high ratio of utility gains from 
the policy 𝑥 versus consumption c, the good is more likely to be 
rich-biased. Again, this is intuitive because it will take more 
money to compensate for the gain of x if the marginal utility of 
income is lower relative to the marginal utility of the good 𝑥. 
1. Derivation of utility result. 
The goal of the result is to sign 𝜕
G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
 as a function of utilities. 
As noted above, there are two goods, policy variable 𝑥 and 
numeraire consumption good 𝑐 such that utility 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢 𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 . 
Suppose that the policy variable 𝑥 is entirely government 
provided, so that endowment 𝑦 = 𝑐 (because the only thing to 
spend money on is 𝑐). As a result, we can discuss the marginal 
utility of consumption 𝑐 and the marginal utility of income 𝑦 
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equivalently.164 Thus, 𝜕
G𝑠
𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
. Suppress taxes because their 
presence adds terms without adding insight. Also, suppress prices 
because this Article has only a government-provided good and a 
numeraire good. 
To start, recall that 𝑠 is defined as follows: 𝑠 = 𝑒 𝑣𝑖A -	𝑒𝑖 𝑣𝑖B . 
But we know that 𝑣𝑖A = 𝑢 𝑐𝑖, 𝑥A  and 𝑣𝑖B = 𝑢 𝑐𝑖, 𝑥B . That is, we can 
replace utility achieved 𝑣 with the utility function 𝑢. Furthermore, 
because the equivalent variation is equal to the change in the 
value of the expenditure function accompanying a policy 
change,165 equivalent variation (or “surplus,” 𝑠) can be replaced 
with the expenditure function 𝑒. Making that substitution and 
working out the derivative yields: 
𝜕F𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕F 𝑒 𝑢 𝑥, 𝑐
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑒
𝑑𝑢
∙ 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
= 𝑑F𝑒
𝑑𝑢F ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑐 ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑥 + 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢 ∙ 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥 
Thus: 
 𝜕F𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 𝑑F𝑒
𝑑𝑢F ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑐 ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑥 + 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢 ∙ 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥 (1) 
Turning away from this line of argument for a moment, we 
know from price theory that 𝑒 𝑣 = 𝑒 𝑢 𝑐 = 𝑐 because individu-
als allocate their entire budget to a single numeraire good with 
a price of 1. That is, total expenditure will equal one’s endow-
ment, which in this case is equal to 𝑐.	Totally differentiating 
𝑒 𝑢 𝑐, 𝑥 = 𝑐 with respect to 𝑐 yields: 
𝑑𝑒
𝑑𝑢
∙ 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
= 1 
Totally differentiating with respect to 𝑐 a second time yields: 
𝑑F𝑒
𝑑𝑢F ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑐 ∙ 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝑐 + 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢 ∙ 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑐F = 0 
Rearranging gives: 
 
 164 In a more general model, it could also be the case that 𝑥 is a variable over which 
individuals can optimize, but that is left to future work. 
 165 This statement is literally true only for marginal policy changes. For a 
nonmarginal policy change, the expenditure function changes due to wealth effects. For 
utility functions without wealth effects, the approximation of discussing marginal policy 
changes does not matter because the expenditure function does not change with more 
wealth in those cases. 
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 𝑑F𝑒
𝑑𝑢F = − 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢 ∙ 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑐G𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
F  (2) 
Substituting (2) into (1) gives (after simplification): 
 𝜕F𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
− 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 (3) 
As a result, assuming that 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
> 0, (that is, utility is increasing 
in consumption), the sign of 𝜕
G𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
 is the sign of 
 
 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
− 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 (4) 
This proves the result. 
D. Legal Entitlement Neutrality and Normal and Inferior 
Goods 
This setup also produces the following result: 
Result 2: Rich-biased goods are “normal” goods, in which de-
mand for the good increases with income; poor-biased goods 
are “inferior” goods, in which demand for the good decreases 
with income. 
I begin by introducing the notation that 𝑝 is the price in a 
hypothetical market for good 𝑥. The maximization problem is 
then the same as before: 
 
𝑢 𝑥, 𝑐  
s.t. 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑥 = 𝐼 
 
This implies that we can rewrite the utility function 
as	𝑢(𝑥, 𝐼 − 𝑝𝑥). 
The first-order condition is 
 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑥
+ 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑥
= 0 
 ⇒ 𝑝 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑥
 (5) 
 
This condition holds at the utility-maximizing point, (𝑥∗, 𝑐∗) 
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 𝑝
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑐
(𝑥∗, 𝑐∗) = 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑥
(𝑥∗, 𝑐∗) (6) 
 
Taking the derivative of (6) with respect to 𝐼 yields 
 
 
𝑝
𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
+ 𝑝 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F 𝜕𝑐∗𝜕𝐼= 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑥F 𝜕𝑥∗𝜕𝐼 + 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 𝜕𝑐∗𝜕𝐼  (7) 
Note that  
 𝑐∗ = 𝐼 − 𝑝𝑥∗ ⟹ 	 𝜕𝑐∗
𝜕𝐼= 1 − 𝑝 𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
 
(8) 
Substituting (8) into (7), 
𝑝
𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
+ 𝑝 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F 1 − 𝑝 𝜕𝑥∗𝜕𝐼 = 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑥F 𝜕𝑥∗𝜕𝐼 + 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 1 − 𝑝 𝜕𝑥∗𝜕𝐼  
 ⇒ 𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
= 𝑝 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑐G − 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
𝑝F 𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G + 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥G − 2𝑝 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 (9) 
 
Finally, by (5), I can rewrite (9) as 
𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
= 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑐G ⋅ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 − 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
𝑝F 𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G + 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥G − 2𝑝 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 
 
 
𝜕𝑥∗
𝜕𝐼
= 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑐G ⋅ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 − 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐
𝑝F 𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G + 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥G − 2𝑝 𝜕G𝑢𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑐 (10) 
Note that the denominator is the second-order condition, 
which by the normal regularity conditions is negative. 
Thus, by (4), 𝜕𝑥
∗
𝜕𝐼
> 0 (that is, 𝑥 is a normal good) if and only if 
𝑥 is rich-biased, 𝜕𝑥
∗
𝜕𝐼
< 0 (that is 𝑥 is an inferior good) if and only if 
𝑥 is poor-biased, and 𝜕𝑥
∗
𝜕𝐼
= 0 if and only if 𝑥 is a neutral good. 
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E. Legal Entitlement Neutrality: Graphical and Utility 
Representations 
This Section of the Appendix presents two additional ways of 
helping to understand legal entitlement neutrality. The first way 
is through graphical demonstrations of the forms of bias, comple-
menting the portion in the main body of the text on rich bias. The 
second way is an exploration of utility functions, which helps 
show why poor-biased policies are rare and rich-biased policies 
are common. It turns out that utility functions that economists 
are familiar with tend to be rich-biased. Economists use these 
utility functions not only because they are relatively convenient 
but also because they conform with consumer behavior: for exam-
ple, declining willingness to pay as quantities increase and a pref-
erence for diversity. This Section of the Appendix shows which 
utility functions correspond to which type of policy and shows 
graphically why they exhibit their type of bias. 
1. Rich-biased policies. 
Many of the most common utility functions are rich-biased. 
Consider the following examples. 
Separable utility functions: For any separable utility function 
(in which 𝑢 = 𝑓 𝑐 + 𝑓(𝑥)), 𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
= 0. As a result, the sign of (3) is 
positive, and thus there is prorich bias. 
Cobb-Douglas: For utility functions of the form 𝑢 = 𝐴𝑐𝛼𝑥AX𝛼, 
for 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝐴 > 0, we know that policies are rich-biased 
because 𝜕
G𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
= 𝐴	𝛼 1 − 𝛼 𝑐𝛼XA𝑥X𝛼 > 0 because every term is 
positive. Thus, equation (3) is positive, and this utility function is 
rich-biased. 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution: Constant elasticity of 
substitution utility functions of the form 𝑢 = 𝛼𝑐𝑟 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑥𝑟 A/𝑟, 
for 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and −∞ < 𝑟 < 1. For these, we know  
𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
− 𝜕G𝑢
𝜕𝑐G ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 = (1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(𝛼𝑐𝑟 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑥𝑟)?𝑟XA𝑥𝑟XA𝑐XA > 0. 166 
We know that this result is positive because every term is positive 
 
 166 We know OGPO7OQ = 𝛼(1 − 𝛼) 1 − 𝑟 𝛼𝑐2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥2 ?^XF𝑐2XA𝑥2XA and OGPO7G = 𝛼F 1 −𝑟 𝛼𝑐2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥2 ?^XF𝑐F2XF + 𝛼(1 − 𝑟) 𝛼𝑐2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥2 ?^XA𝑐2XF. Thus because OGPO7G ∙ OP OQOP O7 =𝛼 1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝑟 𝛼𝑐2 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑥2 ?^XF𝑐2XA𝑥2XA +	(𝑟 − 1)(1 − 𝛼)(𝛼𝑐2 + 1 − 𝛼 𝑥2)?^XA𝑥2XA𝑐XA), 
the first half of which is equal to OGPO7OQ, we get this result. 
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as a result of 𝛼, 𝑟 < 1. So equation (3) is positive, and these func-
tions are rich-biased. 
An example rich-biased utility function for the homeowners 
in the torts example in the main body of the text is 𝑢 = log 𝑐 +log 𝑥 , where 𝑐 is consumption and 𝑥 is a clean environment. That 
is, there is a declining marginal utility of consumption, and 
everyone gets the same (declining) utility from a clean 
environment. 
2. Neutral policies. 
Determining the sign of (3) is trivially easy when the “good” 
is the same thing as the numeraire good, or money. Then 𝑐 = 𝑥, 
and (3) reduces to 
𝜕 𝜕𝑠/𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑐
= 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F − 𝜕F𝑢𝜕𝑐F ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 = 0 
which meets the definition of a neutral policy. 
An example neutral utility function for the laundromat own-
ers in the torts example in the main body of the text is 𝑢 =log 𝑐 + 𝑥 , where 𝑐 is consumption and 𝑥 consists of the profits 
that result from having cleaner air. Thus, the laundromat owners 
value the profits from their laundromats just like any other 
money that leads to consumption. 
To understand the results graphically, recall Figure 1 on rich-
biased policies in the main body of the text, which shows utility 
gains from a policy that are the same for the rich and the poor. 
Compare that figure to Figure 3, which has utility gains not from 
gaining a rich-biased good but rather from gaining dollars. 
Figure 3A compares the utility gains for a given dollar gain 
between the rich and the poor. Because of the declining marginal 
utility of income, a given dollar gain will result in a smaller utility 
gain to the rich than to the poor, as reflected on the y-axis. 
However, the same dollar gain will result in the exact same 
willingness to pay between the rich and the poor, as reflected on 
the x-axis. Thus, as shown in Figure 3B, for a given dollar gain 
(say, $100), the income of the person receiving the income does 
not vary the willingness of the person to pay for the dollar gain: a 
dollar is worth a dollar to everyone. 
1714 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1649 
FIGURE 3:  RELATIONSHIPS FOR NEUTRAL POLICY 
FIGURE 3A:  UTILITY VERSUS INCOME 
 
FIGURE 3B:  WTP VERSUS INCOME 
 
3. Poor-biased policies. 
Take the utility function 𝑢 = log 𝑥 − AF − 2 ∙ log 10 − 𝑐 ,	for 
𝑥 > AF and 0 ≤ 𝑐 < 10, which is a member of a class of utility func-
tions for which 𝑥 is an “inferior” good (for example, bus service) in 
Poor: willingness 
to pay 
Rich: willingness 
to pay 
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which the poor demand a higher quantity of it than the rich do.167 
Here, we know:168 
𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑥
− 𝜕F𝑢
𝜕𝑐F ∙ 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝑐 = 0 − 1(10 − 𝑐)(𝑥 − 0.5) < 0 
So this utility function is poor-biased. 
One can think of poor-biased policies graphically as those for 
which there is such an enormous difference in the utility gained 
by a rich and a poor person that the difference overcomes the de-
clining marginal utility of income—in other words, it overcomes 
the fact that it is a lot more expensive to pay off a rich person than 
a poor person in dollars for a given utility gain because of the de-
clining marginal utility of consumption. Figure 4 shows this case. 
Because the utility gains to the rich are so much smaller than 
those to the poor on the y-axis of Figure 4A, the poor actually have 
a larger willingness to pay on the x-axis. The declining willing-
ness to pay with income in Figure 4B results. 
  
 
 167 See generally Rein Haagsma, A Convenient Utility Function with Giffen Behaviour 
(International Scholarly Research Network Economics, Sept 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SU5N-HX7T. 
 168 Note that OPOQ = 	 AQXB._ , OPO7 = FABX7, OGPO7G = F(ABX7)G , OGPOQG = XA(QXB._)G,	and OPO7OQ = 0.  
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FIGURE 4:  RELATIONSHIPS FOR POOR-BIASED POLICY 
FIGURE 4A:  UTILITY VERSUS INCOME 
 
FIGURE 4B:  WTP VERSUS INCOME 
 
4. Intuition for the “rich get richer” principle. 
The result here shows that the bias of the policy depends on 
the comparison of how utility changes with income and the mar-
ginal utility of income. The earlier figures portray this compari-
son by showing on the y-axis with brackets the different utility 
gains of rich and poor people for a policy change and then using 
the curve for the marginal utility of income to translate those util-
ity gains from a policy change into a willingness to pay. 
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To see this graphically a different way, consider Figure 5, 
which beneath the axis shows who (the rich or the poor) gains 
more utility from a policy change and above the axis shows the 
direction of the bias. On the left half of the figure, the rich gain 
more utility than the poor: those policies are rich-biased, as the 
scale above the axis shows. In the middle (“Rich = poor”), utility 
gains are equal. At that point, the policy exhibits prorich bias. To 
the right of that point, the poor gain more utility than the rich, 
but the prorich bias continues until the utility gains from the pol-
icy decline at the same rate as the marginal utility of consumption 
declines, at which point the policy is neutral. It is only to the right 
of that point—a narrow portion of the overall spectrum—that 
there is propoor bias. The nature of efficiency is such that it tends 
to produce outcomes that favor the rich. 
FIGURE 5: BIAS AND UTILITY GAINS FROM POLICY 
 
F. Math for Tradable Pollution Rights 
Part III.F describes tradable pollution rights. This Section 
solves for the price with these tradable pollution rights. 
1. Optimal allocation. 
The poor maximize 𝑢𝑝 = log 1 + 𝑥𝑝 + log 𝑐𝑝  s.t. 𝑐𝑝 = 	𝑦𝑝 +
𝑔 𝑥𝑝 − 𝑥𝑝 , and the rich maximize 𝑢𝑟 = log 1 + 𝑥𝑟 + log 𝑐𝑟  s.t. 𝑐𝑟 =	𝑦𝑟 + 𝑔 𝑥𝑟 − 𝑥𝑟  by choosing cleanliness units 𝑥𝑝 and 𝑥𝑟, respec-
tively, given price for cleanliness 𝑔, initial allocations of cleanli-
ness 𝑥𝑝 and 𝑥𝑟, and income allocations 𝑦𝑝 and 𝑦𝑟. The social plan-
ner wants to choose 𝑥𝑝 and 𝑥𝑟 so as to maximize 
 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑢𝑝 (11) 
There are ten units of cleanliness in total, so 
 𝑥𝑝 + 𝑥𝑟 = 10 (12) 
 and 𝑥𝑝 + 𝑥𝑟 = 10  (13) 
Who Gains More Utility from Policy 
Rich = poor Relative gain 
at rate = MUC 
Rich-biased Poor-biased Neutral 
Rich Poor 
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The initial endowments are 𝑦𝑝 = 1 and 𝑦2 = 9. 
To solve for the initial allocations, the final allocations, and 
the price of a unit of cleanliness, I first solve for the cleanliness 
demand curves of the rich and the poor. Rewriting the utility 
functions in terms of cleanliness yields 𝑢𝑝 = log 1 + 𝑥𝑝 +log 𝑦𝑝 + 𝑔𝑥𝑝 − 𝑔𝑥𝑝  and 𝑢𝑟 = log 1 + 𝑥𝑟 + log 𝑦𝑟 + 𝑔𝑥𝑟 − 𝑔𝑥𝑟 . Tak-
ing the first-order conditions with respect to cleanliness gives the 
demand curves 
𝑥𝑝 = 	 𝑦𝑝a𝑔𝑥𝑝X	𝑔F𝑔 	(14)  
and 𝑥𝑟 = 	 𝑦𝑟a𝑔𝑥𝑟X	𝑔F𝑔 	(15) 
Combining the demand curves (14–15), equation (12), and the 
social welfare function (11), we get SWF = log 	𝑦𝑝a𝑔𝑥𝑝a	𝑔F𝑔 +log 	𝑦𝑝a𝑔𝑥𝑝a𝑔F + 	 log 𝑦𝑟a𝑔(ABX𝑥𝑝)a	𝑔F𝑔 +	 log 𝑦𝑟a𝑔(ABX𝑥𝑝)a	𝑔F . Solving the 
first-order condition for 𝑥𝑝 and substituting in the values of the 
endowments gives: 
𝑥𝑝 = 	5𝑔 + 4𝑔  
This implies that 𝑥𝑟 = 	 _𝑔Xb𝑔 	, 𝑥𝑟 = 	 _ab𝑔F𝑔 , and 𝑥𝑝 = 	 _ab𝑔F𝑔 . Com-
bining the final allocations with equation (13) reveals that the 
price of cleanliness is 𝑔 = _c. With this price we can solve for all 
other values. Thus,	𝑥𝑝 = 	 bd_ , 𝑥𝑟 = 	 A_	 , 	𝑥𝑝 = 	𝑥𝑟 = 	𝑐𝑝 = 	𝑐𝑟 = 5. 
2. Even allocation with trading. 
If the initial allocation of cleanliness is five for both rich and 
the poor, then substituting into the demand curves (14 and 15) 
along with the initial endowments gives 
𝑥𝑝 = 	 Aab𝑔F𝑔  and 𝑥𝑟 = dab𝑔F𝑔  
Combining this with equation (13) gives that the price is 
again 𝑔 = _c and the final allocations are 𝑥𝑝 = 	 Ae_  and 𝑥𝑟 = ef_ . 
